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Abstract
My Ph.D. thesis consists of three chapters on Information Economics in which I explore the
consequences of the lack of information in the decision-making process of the agents. In the first
Chapter, I present a monopoly model of two periods with risk-averse consumers. The quality
of the product is uncertain for all the agents in the first period and the switching costs arise
endogenously because of the faced risk. When the consumers learn the quality in the second
period, two effects take place: first, the uncertainty disappears and the willingness to pay in-
creases; and second, the true quality is revealed and the willingness to pay reacts consequently
(it increases for high qualities and decreases for low qualities). When the consumers do not learn
the quality in the second period, the uncertainty keeps being penalized. The model predicts that
the bargain-then ripoff pattern of prices can be reversed for sufficiently low realizations of the
quality, and that the first-period price set in the presence of switching costs is always lower than
the first-period price set in a market without switching costs.
In the second Chapter, I extend the previous set-up to a duopoly market. One of the firms
is known to offer a product of quality zero, whereas the quality of the product supplied by the
other firm is uncertain but larger than zero in expected terms. The two effects described in the
monopoly case when the consumers learn the quality still take place. However, in this model
the consumers have two pieces of information (the prices of the two firms) to infer the uncertain
quality in the second period if they did not gather the information through direct experience.
The predictions of the model differ from those of the monopoly case. First, the bargain-then-
ripoff pattern of prices can be reversed but not for the two firms simultaneously. Second, the
most relevant result is that the average price in the first period can be larger in the presence of
switching costs than in their absence, contrary to the conventional wisdom. This result happens
because, given the expected quality, the firm that offers the riskless product has a competitive
advantage in the first period when consumers are sufficiently risk averse that does not exist
when consumers are risk neutral. It may happen that its rival cannot compensate completely
this advantage through a price decrease because negative prices are not allowed.
In the third Chapter, I construct a model to analyze the effect of the piracy in the music industry
in a situation with initial copyrights. I assume a for-profit platform and an open platform, two
consumers who are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for the tracks, and two artists that
may be heterogeneous in their popularity (famous or unknown). The artists obtain their profits
from both the sale of tracks and the attendance to concerts. These two businesses are related
in a very particular way if the artist is unknown: a consumer will decide about attending or not
to the concert only if she has learned about the existence of the artist in advance by listening to
his tracks. Then, the introduction of piracy has two effects: the prices charged by the for-profit
platform decrease, but the unknown artists always obtain the maximal degree of diffusion (the
i
ii
famous artists had it without piracy too). I find that the total surplus does not decrease with
piracy if the revenues from concerts are included in the negotiation process between the artist
and the for-profit platform, but it may decrease if the parties only share the revenues from
the tracks. Also, the for-profit platform and the famous artists are always damaged by piracy,
although the consumers and the unknown artists may be better off.
Resumen
Mi tesis doctoral consta de tres cap´ıtulos sobre la Economı´a de la Informacio´n en los que exploro
las consecuencias de la falta de informacio´n en el proceso de toma de decisiones de los agentes.
En el primer Cap´ıtulo, presento un modelo de monopolio de dos periodos con consumidores
aversos al riesgo. La calidad del producto es incierta para todos los agentes en el primer periodo
y los costes de cambio surgen endo´genamente por al riesgo asociado. Cuando los consumidores
aprenden la calidad en el segundo periodo, dos efectos tienen lugar: primero, la incertidumbre
desaparece y la disposicio´n a pagar aumenta; y segundo, se revela la aute´ntica calidad y la dis-
posicio´n a pagar reacciona en consecuencia (aumenta para calidades altas y disminuye para las
bajas). Cuando los consumidores no aprenden la calidad en el segundo periodo, la incertidumbre
se sigue penalizando. El modelo predice que el patro´n de precios ganga-timo se puede revertir
para realizaciones de la calidad suficientemente bajas, y que el precio de equilibrio del primer
periodo con costes de cambio es siempre ma´s bajo que sin costes de cambio.
En el segundo Cap´ıtulo, extiendo el marco anterior a un mercado de duopolio. Se sabe que
una de las empresas ofrece un producto de calidad cero, mientras que la calidad del producto
ofrecido por el rival es incierta pero mayor que cero en te´rminos esperados. Los dos efectos
descritos anteriormente cuando los consumidores aprenden la calidad tambie´n tienen lugar aqu´ı.
Sin embargo, en este modelo los consumidores tienen dos piezas de informacio´n (los precios de
las empresas) para inferir la calidad en el segundo periodo si no compraron previamente. Las
predicciones del modelo difieren de las del caso de monopolio. Primero, el patro´n de precios
ganga-timo se puede revertir pero no para las dos empresas simulta´neamente. Segundo, el resul-
tado ma´s relevante es que el precio medio en el primer periodo puede ser mayor en presencia de
costes de cambio que en su ausencia, al contrario de lo predicho por los modelos tradicionales.
Este resultado sucede porque, dada la calidad esperada, la empresa que ofrece el producto sin
riesgo tiene una ventaja competitiva en el primer periodo cuando los consumidores son aversos
al riesgo que no existe cuando los consumidores son neutrales al riesgo. Es posible que el rival
no pueda compensar totalmente esta ventaja mediante una bajada de precios ya que los precios
negativos no se permiten.
En el tercer Cap´ıtulo, construyo un modelo para analizar el efecto de la pirater´ıa en la in-
dustria musical partiendo de una situacio´n inicial con copyright. Asumo una plataforma con
fines de lucro y una plataforma abierta, dos consumidores heteroge´neos en su disposicio´n a pagar
por las pistas de mu´sica, y dos artistas que pueden ser heteroge´neos en su popularidad (famosos
o desconocidos). Los artistas obtienen sus beneficios tanto de la venta de pistas como de la asis-
tencia a los conciertos. Estos dos negocios se relacionan de un modo muy particular si el artista
es desconocido: un consumidor decidira´ si asistir o no al concierto solo si sabe previamente de
la existencia del artista gracias a haber escuchado sus pistas. As´ı, la pirater´ıa tiene dos efectos:
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los precios que puede cargar la plataforma con fines de lucro disminuyen, pero los artistas de-
sconocidos siempre obtienen el grado ma´ximo de difusio´n (los artistas famosos ya lo ten´ıan sin
pirater´ıa). Encuentro que el bienestar total no disminuye con la introduccio´n de la pirater´ıa si los
ingresos por conciertos se incluyen en el proceso de negociacio´n entre el artista y la plataforma
con fines de lucro, pero puede disminuir si solo se reparten los ingresos de las pistas. Del mismo
modo, la plataforma con fines de lucro y los artistas famosos siempre salen perjudicados por la
pirater´ıa, aunque los consumidores y los artistas desconocidos pueden mejorar.
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Chapter 1
Switching Costs derived from
Uncertainty: the Monopoly Case
1.1 Introduction
In many markets, consumers who have acquired the product offered by a certain firm face costs
of switching to a competitor’s product. This implies that products that were ex-ante homoge-
neous become ex-post heterogeneous. The idea can be easily extended to a monopolistic market
when the outside option of not buying is allowed: in the second period, consumers are divided
into those who bought the product in the first period and those who did not. Assuming that
the good is not storable and that price discrimination is not possible, a consumer who buys the
good in the second period has a larger utility if she also acquired it in the first period because
of the switching cost.
In two-period models with switching costs, the equilibrium prices usually display a bargain-then-
ripoff pattern. In the second period, the firm takes advantage of the captive consumers and sets
a high price (this is commonly known as the harvesting effect). Anticipating the large profit of
the second period, the firm has incentives to decrease the price in the first period (investment
effect). In this regard, most of the research has focused on determining which effect dominates
in terms of the average market price: conventional wisdom states that the harvesting effect dom-
inates (Klemperer (1987b); Farrell and Klemperer (2007)), but this result has been challenged
several times (Doganoglu (2010); Cabral (2012)).
Different reasons for the existence of switching costs have been established: a need for compati-
bility with existing equipment, transaction costs, learning costs, uncertainty about the product
quality, and discount coupons (Klemperer (1995)). Nevertheless, not much attention has been
1
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given to determine whether the firm actually has incentives to follow the bargain-then-ripoff pat-
tern of prices in the presence of all possible types of switching costs. One of the scarce examples
of this is Nilssen (1990): he distinguishes transaction costs and learning costs, such that trans-
action costs are incurred by a consumer at every switch between suppliers and learning costs
are incurred only at a switch to a supplier that is new to the consumer. By keeping constant
the total switching cost faced by a consumer, the author examines the effect of changing the
proportion of each kind of switching cost in a market open for an infinite number of periods.
Assuming that price discrimination is possible, he finds that for a fixed proportion of learning
and transaction costs, there exists an equilibrium in which all prices in the steady state are below
the monopoly price. Even more, these prices are ordered such that the price charged by the
incumbent in the second period to a loyal customer is higher than the price charged to a disloyal
customer, higher than the price set by the rival firm, and higher than the single first-period
price. Also, the author shows that an increase in the relative weight of the transaction costs
increases the price offered to loyal consumers, whereas decreases the first-period prices and the
total welfare.
His approach differs from mine in several ways. First, in my framework of switching costs de-
rived from uncertainty I do not allow for price discrimination, so I will not have to differentiate
between several equilibrium prices in the second period. Second, and most important, this type
of switching costs can be spread to all consumers in the market through a credible signal about
the quality (price): if the uncertainty is eliminated in the second period through a credible price,
then all the risk-averse consumers benefit from the lack of uncertainty in the second period and
increase their willingness to pay in the same amount, independently of having acquired the good
in the previous period or not.
As can be inferred from the previous paragraph, my proposal is designed to point out that, in
principle, it is not necessary to acquire the good to learn its quality: this information could
be transmitted truthfully through a signal. Therefore, consumers who tested the good and
consumers who did not can have the same increase of utility in the second period due to the re-
duction of the uncertainty about the product quality (notice that, for this increase to take place,
consumers have to be risk-averse). I use a mean-variance analysis to differentiate in a natural
way between two effects when additional information is gathered: if consumers are risk-averse,
more information means less uncertainty and higher utility (source of the endogenous switching
cost1); also, consumers’ willingness to pay has to react according to the disclosed quality of
the product (the higher the quality, the larger the willingness to pay). The single element that
enters heterogeneity across consumers in the first period is their location on the unit interval
(horizontal differentiation).
A critical aspect of the model is to determine under what conditions the signal is credible, in
which case the information acquired through direct experience is exactly the same as the one
1A different alternative to model endogenous switching costs can be found in Villas-Boas (2006)
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revealed by the firm through second-period prices. Thus, in addition to the literature of switch-
ing costs, the research is related to the signaling theory. A close paper is Judd and Riordan
(1994): the authors consider a dynamic monopoly problem of two periods in which consumer’s
valuation is uncertain because nobody knows the level of the quality. In the first period, nature
chooses the quality level but nobody observes it and the monopolist announces the first-period
price. After purchasing, a consumer observes his/her individual experience, that is a signal of
the quality, and the firm observes a different signal also correlated to the quality level before
setting the second-period price. Then, each consumer’s information set will consist of his/her
own experience and the commonly observed price. A high second-period price has two effects:
the direct effect of a decrease in the demand, and the indirect effect of an improvement in the
consumers’ inference about product quality. They analyze the Nash-Bayes equilibrium under
several assumptions, and find that the equilibrium price of the second period is larger than the
monopoly price when the quality level is common knowledge; that is, for the signal to be a
valid statistic, it has to exceed the full-information price. Optimal fist-period price is just the
monopoly level.
There is an important difference between Judd and Riordan (1994) approach and mine. Although
in both models the quality cannot be observed until consumers have purchased the good, they
assume that the signal observed by the monopolist is different than the experience obtained by
consumers, and in equilibrium the two can be informative. On the contrary, I assume that the
signal observed by the monopolist is the same as the one derived from direct experience. Also,
I consider that the quality is a random variable that follows a normal distribution and that
all production costs are normalized to zero, independently of the quality. Under these assump-
tions, it is possible to show that a separating equilibrium does not exist if the market share of
the firm in the first period was positive but not all the consumers tested the product: all the
qualities below a certain threshold have incentives to mimic the prices of other superior qualities.
Other related studies are Bagwell and Riordan (1991); and Wolinsky (1983). Bagwell and Ri-
ordan (1991) assume a multi-period problem in which the firm has to introduce a new product
which can be of high or low quality. The quality level is known by the firm before setting
the first-period price, but not by consumers. They show that there exists a separating equilib-
rium such that the high quality product will be sold at a price higher than the full-information
monopoly price in the first period. The high introductory price signals high quality because a
firm facing high costs is more willing to restrict the volume of sales than a firm facing low costs.
As information about product quality diffuses and more consumers become informed, it becomes
easier for the firm to signal a high quality; in other words, the mark-up between the market price
and the full-information price does not need to be so large. Consequently, the price declines until
reaching the full-information level. The dynamic pattern of prices is explained because the firm
knows its true quality before setting the price in the first period and because prices are not
fully informative: instead, after observing the price, consumers believe the product to be of high
quality with probability b ∈ (0, 1). These two features differ in my approach: as in Judd and
Riordan (1994), I consider that the firm does not know its quality when setting the first-period
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prices; as it was mentioned above, a separating equilibrium cannot exist in the second period
unless all consumers tested the product in the first period: the qualities which earn zero profits
in the full-information equilibrium will always want to mimic the prices of superior qualities
if there is a chance of deceiving a positive fraction of consumers, independently of the price
distortion used by the superior qualities. Nevertheless, we both work with the hypothesis that
consumers who acquire the product learn its true quality.
In Wolinsky (1983), the product quality is not random: firms can select any quality they like,
but higher qualities are more costly to produce. Consumers do not know the quality chosen by
a firm, but prices will convey some information about it. The author shows the existence of a
Bayesian equilibrium in which each quality level is signaled by a different price. As before, equi-
librium prices are higher than the full-information prices. Further, the poorer the information
received by consumers, the larger the mark-up.
In this paper, I present a monopoly model2 to answer two questions: first, if the usually predicted
bargain-then-ripoff pattern of prices can be reversed when we analyze the case of switching costs
which arise endogenously due to the lack of information; second, if the first-period price in the
presence of switching costs can be higher than the first-period price in the same model without
the switching cost (this is, in a model with risk-neutral consumers who only care about the
quality of the product).
Let me provide here the intuitive answers to the previous questions. In the first period, there
may be three outcomes: everybody tests the product, nobody tests the product, and only some
consumers test the product. The realization of one of the three outcomes will determine the
equilibrium price of the second period: in the first outcome, the information is disclosed and
the monopolist charges the full-information price; in the second outcome, information cannot
be disclosed and the monopolist has to compensate for the uncertainty still faced by consumers;
and in the third outcome, there is no separating equilibrium. The result of the third outcome is
not important for the first-period equilibrium price, since under the assumptions maintained in
the model, the probability of this event does not depend on the first-period prices. Then, only
the first two outcomes matter. If the first outcome takes place in the first period, the producer
does not have to compensate for the uncertainty in the second period because everybody tested
the product and gathered the information directly; nevertheless, the willingness to pay reacts
to the quality (and remember that the support of a random variable normally distributed is
(−∞,+∞). If the second outcome takes place in the first period, uncertainty still has to be
compensated in the second period but consumers take the expected quality in the ex-ante utility.
In addition, consumers also have to be compensated for the uncertainty in the first period. The
first-period objective function of the monopolist then considers the expected profit in the first
period plus the expected profit in the second period, and the first-period equilibrium price is the
solution to the maximization problem. The bargain-then-ripoff pattern of prices can be reversed
if information is disclosed and the realization of the quality is low enough: in the problem of
the first period every possible realization of the quality is weighted by its probability, but a low
2In a monopoly model, the outside option is seen as a riskless alternative acquired at zero cost.
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realization in the second period when everybody tested the product leads to a low price, that
can be lower than the first-period price when the quality is bad enough. However, the price
charged in the first period with risk-averse consumers is always lower than the price charged in
the first period with risk-neutral consumers.
About the second question, notice the following: the expected profits in the second period when
information is disclosed are the same when consumers are risk-averse and when they are risk-
neutral: if information is disclosed, there is no uncertainty. However, the expected profits in
the second period if information cannot be disclosed are larger when consumers are risk-neutral
than when they are risk-averse, because in the first case the uncertainty does not have to be
compensated. Then, the incentive of the monopolist to induce the consumers to acquire the
good in the first period is stronger when consumers are risk-averse: therefore, it charges a lower
first-period price in the presence of switching costs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the model is described in Section 2. The equi-
librium of the second period is derived in Section 3 and the equilibrium of the first period is
derived in Section 4. In Section 5 I solve the problem without switching costs and compare the
outcomes, and finally in Section 6 I present the conclusions.
1.2 The Model
Consider a model of two periods with a monopolist located at point 0 of the unit interval. It
sells a product or a service that is not storable, lives during the entire game and its discount
factor is equal to 1 (the monopolist is not myopic). The charged prices can be different across
periods, but price-discrimination among consumers who live in the same period is not allowed.
All the production costs are normalized to zero.
There is a mass of consumers uniformly distributed along the unit interval in each one of the
two periods; that is, consumers of the first period are different from consumers of the second pe-
riod. Nevertheless, a consumer located at point xi in the second period inherits the information
gathered by the consumer located at her position in the first period. It is reasonable to assume
this because the evidence states that people learn from the experience of others3.
In the first period, the quality of the product is unknown and is denoted by q. q¯ denotes its
realization. When the quality is unknown, all the agents assume the following:
3Although this assumption is technically equivalent to considering myopic consumers, the interpretation is
very different.
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Assumption 1. The quality is a random variable normally distributed with mean µ > 0 and
variance σ2:
q ∼ N(µ, σ)
The timing of the game is as follows:
Period 1
· The quality, q, is realized and remains the same for the rest of the game. At this
stage, nobody observes the realization q¯
· The monopolist sets the first-period price, p1
· The consumers make their consumption choices
· The monopolist observes the first period market share, xˆ1. Both the monopolist and
the consumers who acquired the product observe the true quality q¯ and the agents
receive their payoffs
Period 2
· The consumers of the second period observe the first-period market share
· The consumer located at xi in the second period inherits the information gathered by
the consumer located at her position in the first period, ∀xi ∈ [0, 1]. The consumers
are then divided into two groups: informed (those who have information about the
quality of the good through the previous experience of the individuals located at their
position) and uninformed (those who do not)
· The monopolist sets the second-period price, p2
· The uninformed consumers use the second-period price and the first-period market
share to update their beliefs
· The consumers make their consumption choices, agents receive their payoffs and the
game finishes.
It can seem weird that the monopolist does not know the quality of its product at the beginning
of the game. The term quality should be understood as something slightly more sophisticated: it
is the perception of the consumers about the product. Then, it makes sense that this perception
can only be learned after the consumption choices of the first period. Concretely, consumers who
tested the product get this information directly, and the monopolist undertakes some market
research at a negligible cost to learn it. Communication among consumers is not allowed, and
I consider implicitly that the consumers do not have the resources owned by the monopolist to
undertake the market research4.
4Similar considerations are assumed in Judd and Riordan (1994).
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Let me now explain how consumers make their consumption decisions. The consumers can
acquire one unit of the product or stay out of the market. If they decide not to acquire it, the
utility of the outside option is normalized to 0 in both periods:
uo,1 = uo,2 = uo = 0 (1.1)
The utility function is exponential
ui(q) = −e−ρ(q−Ki,t) (1.2)
where ρ > 0 is the risk-aversion coefficient and Ki,t is a set of other parameters that can differ
across periods and consumers.
When the true realization is unknown, the quality is assumed to be normally distributed. Then,
maximize the expected utility of the consumer is equivalent to maximize the certainty equiva-
lent5:
µ− 1
2
(ρσ2)−Ki,t (1.3)
In other words, the mean-variance analysis is optimal.
In the first period,
K1,i = p1 + xi − z (1.4)
Thus, the certainty equivalent of the consumer located at xi in the first period is
µ− 1
2
(ρσ2)− p1 − xi + z (1.5)
where p1 is the first-period price, xi is the location
6 of the individual i and z is private informa-
tion of the consumers.
Notice that the private information of the consumers, z, is an element of vertical differentiation.
Also is quality, but all the agents are uninformed about its true value in the first period, so they
use the value of the expected quality µ. There is a single element of horizontal differentiation:
the location of the consumers.
The marginal consumer of the first period comes from equalizing the equations (1.1) and (1.5):
xˆ1 =
1
2
(
2µ− ρσ2 − 2p1 + 2z) (1.6)
5A formal proof of this statement can be found in the Appendix.
6The transportation costs are normalized to 1: τ = 1.
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Since the firm does not know the value of z, it considers that it is a random variable uniformly
distributed:
Assumption 2. The monopolist takes z as a random variable uniformly distributed with zero
mean:
z ∼ U(−Z,Z)
with Z large enough.
Notice that for z large enough, xˆ1 ≥ 1; since the size of the market is 1, a marginal consumer
greater than 1 means that all the consumers acquire the good and obtain a strictly positive sur-
plus. For z small enough, xˆ1 ≤ 0; since negative demands are not allowed, a marginal consumer
lower than 0 means that all the consumers choose the outside option.
In the second period,
K2,i = p2 + xi (1.7)
Remember that in the second period the consumers are divided in two groups: informed and un-
informed. If the consumer is informed, she knows the true quality and the uncertainty completely
disappears. Then, her utility function is
q¯ − p2 − xi (1.8)
At this point, it is worth noting that becoming informed through direct experience has two
effects. First, the uncertainty is eliminated and the utility increases in ρσ2/2 with respect to
the case of no information. Second, the true quality is learned and it substitutes the expected
quality µ: then, the utility changes in q¯−µ (increases with respect to the case of no information
if q¯ > µ and decreases otherwise).
The marginal consumer in the second period among the informed consumers is obtained by
equalizing the equations (1.1) and (1.8):
xI2 = q¯ − p2 (1.9)
In contrast to the informed consumers, the uninformed consumers do not have direct information
about the true quality of the product and they use the second-period price and the first-period
market share to update their beliefs:
E[q|(p2, xˆ1)]− 1
2
(ρV ar[q|(p2, xˆ1)])− p2 − xi (1.10)
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The marginal consumer in the second period among the uninformed consumers is obtained by
equalizing the equations (1.1) and (1.10):
xU2 = E[q|(p2, xˆ1)]−
1
2
(ρV ar[q|(p2, xˆ1)])− p2 (1.11)
Although there is a different mass of consumers in each period, the individuals living in the
first period communicate information to the individuals living in the second period. As it
was explained before, this fact affects the inference (and the utility) of the individuals of the
second period. Since the monopolist is forward-looking, the game has to be solved by backward
induction. The equilibrium concept used is the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBNE).
1.3 Equilibrium of the Second Period
There may be three possible situations in the first period, depending on the value of z: all con-
sumers tested the product (xˆ1 ≥ 1), all consumers chose the outside option (xˆ1 ≤ 0) and only
some consumers tested the product (xˆ1 ∈ (0, 1)). The optimal pricing strategy in the second
period depends on the outcome of the first period.
1.3.1 Corner Equilibria
Corner A
This corner takes place when all consumers tested the good in the first period, that is, when
xˆ1 ≥ 1⇔ z ≥ 1− µ+ 1
2
ρσ2 + p1 (1.12)
In this case, all consumers are informed and prices are not informative signals. The equilibrium
prices and market shares are stated in the next Proposition:
Proposition 1. The equilibrium prices and market shares in the case of full information are as
follows:
pI2 =

0 q¯ ≤ 0
q¯/2 q¯ ∈ (0, 2)
q¯ − 1 q¯ ≥ 2
xI2 =

0 q¯ ≤ 0
q¯/2 q¯ ∈ (0, 2)
1 q¯ ≥ 2
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As expected, the market share increases with the quality when the information is complete,
but the corner solutions have to be taken into account: the market share is zero for negative
qualities and one for qualities larger than 2. Notice that these thresholds are ”arbitrary”: we
could re-scale the utility function by adding a positive term R: then, some negative qualities
would have a positive market share due simply to the intrinsic utility of consuming the good
(the threshold 2 will also change). However, for a finite R there will always be a set of qualities
that will supply a null amount of the product and a set of qualities that will supply to the entire
market, charging the corresponding corner prices.
It is also important to remark that negative prices in the second period are dominated: the firm
prefers to make zero profit rather than negative profits.
Corner B
In this corner, nobody tested the good in the first period. Since the demand was zero, the mo-
nopolist cannot undertake the market research to discover how consumers perceive its product;
then, I will say that the information cannot be disclosed.
Technically, this corner takes place when
xˆ1 ≤ 0⇔ z ≤ −µ+ 1
2
(ρσ2) + p1 (1.13)
Since consumers observe the first-period market share, they correctly infer that the second-period
price conveys no information in this corner. Then, making E[q|(p2, xˆ1)] = µ and V ar[q|(p2, xˆ1)] =
σ2 in equation (1.11), the marginal consumer in this corner is
xU2 = µ−
1
2
(ρσ2)− p2 (1.14)
The next Proposition establishes the equilibrium prices and market shares when information
cannot be disclosed:
Proposition 2. The equilibrium prices and market shares when the information cannot be
disclosed are as follows:
pU2 =

0 ρ ≥ 2µ/σ2
(2µ− ρσ2)/4 µ ≤ 2 and ρ < 2µ/σ2; or
µ > 2 and (−4 + 2µ)/σ2 < ρ < 2µ/σ2
(−2 + 2µ− ρσ2)/2 µ > 2 and ρ ≤ (−4 + 2µ)/σ2
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xU2 =

0 ρ ≥ 2µ/σ2
(2µ− ρσ2)/4 µ ≤ 2 and ρ < 2µ/σ2; or
µ > 2 and (−4 + 2µ)/σ2 < ρ < 2µ/σ2
1 µ > 2 and ρ ≤ (−4 + 2µ)/σ2
Notice that the consumers have to be compensated for the faced risk; or in other words, the
price is negatively related to the risk-aversion coefficient. In the extreme case of sufficiently high
risk-aversion, the consumers are simply better off by choosing the outside option and the good is
not traded. As happened with the equilibrium of the previous corner, the qualitative properties
of this equilibrium would not change if we re-scale the utility function: only the thresholds would
be different.
As before, negative prices are dominated.
1.3.2 Interior Equilibrium
In the interior equilibrium, only some consumers tested the good in the first period. This means
that there is a fraction of consumers who do not take the price as a signal of the quality, but
the rest of the consumers do (and actually, they are susceptible of being deceived).
In the signaling games, there may be three different types of equilibria: separating, pooling and
semi-pooling (also known as semi-separating). In this paper, I check the existence or not of
a separating equilibrium. In a separating equilibrium, each type of sender optimally chooses
a different message (in this context, each quality would charge a different price) so that the
consumers can infer his type with no error.
As it was mentioned in the previous section, consumers are divided in two groups: informed and
uninformed consumers. The informed consumers do not take the prices as a signal because they
know the true quality of the product. Then, the demand from this sector can be expressed as
DI2 = min {xˆ1,max {0, q¯ − p2}} (1.15)
The operators min and max come from the corners of the problem: the marginal consumer
among the informed consumers cannot be part of the uninformed group, and negative demands
are not allowed.
The uninformed consumers take the price as a signal of the quality. In a separating equilibrium,
the consumers perfectly infer the quality given the price, so the uncertainty is not an element of
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the utility function anymore. Then, the demand from the uninformed sector can be expressed
as
DU2 = max {0,min{1, q˜ − p2} − xˆ1} (1.16)
where q˜ is the inferred quality.
As before, the operators min and max come from the corners of the problem: the marginal con-
sumer among the uninformed consumers cannot be part of the informed group, and the demand
is constrained by the size of the market.
The trade-off faced by quality q when it pretends to be quality qF > q is clear: by increasing
the price, it increases the expectation of the uninformed consumers but it also loses part of the
demand derived from the informed consumers.
Proposition 3. A separating equilibrium does not exist.
A separating equilibrium does not exist because the non-positive qualities make exactly zero
profits in the full-information equilibrium: it is always profitable to try to deceive to the unin-
formed consumers because, in the worst case of no deceiving them, the monopolist also makes
zero profits. This result holds even when the high qualities distort their prices for the same
reason.
It is also worth noting that, for positive qualities, the qualities that are profitable to mimic are
determined by the fraction of informed consumers. Consider for instance that xˆ1 = 0.3 and the
realized quality q¯ = 3: here, it is not profitable to mimic q˜ = 4 (pimimic = 1.8 < 2 = piinf ),
but it is profitable to mimic q˜ = 5 (pimimic = 2.4 > 2 = piinf ). The example illustrates why it
is statistically impossible to avoid mimicking among the positive qualities: for low fractions of
informed people is not profitable to mimic similar qualities, but it is profitable to mimic qualities
that are much higher. The fraction of informed consumers necessary for making unprofitable to
mimic a very high quality tends to 1. Therefore, the problem is not the infinitesimal distance
between the different qualities: the problem is that very high qualities actually exist.
1.4 Equilibrium of the First Period
The objective function of the monopolist in the first period is the expected profit7 obtained in
period 1 plus the expected profit obtained in period 2.
7The profit of the first period is also expected because the market share is a random variable for the monopolist.
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I have shown that there is no separating equilibrium in the interior case, which in principle could
be a problem to find the expected profit of the second period. However, the next Lemma states
that this equilibrium is irrelevant for the intertemporal maximization problem:
Lemma 1. The probability of being in the interior case in the second period is independent of
the first-period price.
Therefore, in mathematical terms, the equilibrium of the interior case would be like adding a
constant term to the first-period objective function and it would not affect to the solution of the
problem.
The expected profit obtained in the Corner A depends on the parameters of the distribution of
the product quality, µ and σ:
ΠI(µ, σ) = Pr(q ≤ 0)E(0|q ≤ 0) + Pr(q ≥ 2)E(q − 1|q ≥ 2) + Pr(0 < q < 2)E
(
1
4
q2
∣∣∣∣0 < q < 2)
= Pr(q ≥ 2)E(q − 1|q ≥ 2) + Pr(0 < q < 2)E
(
1
4
q2
∣∣∣∣0 < q < 2)
> 0
(1.17)
The profit obtained in the Corner B is defined by the following piecewise function:
ΠU (µ, ρ, σ) =

0 ρ ≥ 2µ/σ2
(2µ− ρσ2)2/16 µ ≤ 2 and ρ < 2µ/σ2; or
µ > 2 and (−4 + 2µ)/σ2 < ρ < 2µ/σ2
(−2 + 2µ− ρσ2)/2 µ > 2 and ρ ≤ (−4 + 2µ)/σ2
(1.18)
The probability of being in the Corner A is
PCA(p1) = Pr(z ≥ 1− µ+ 1
2
ρσ2 + p1)
=
−1− p1 + Z + µ− 12(ρσ2)
2Z
(1.19)
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and the probability of being in the Corner B is
PCB(p1) = Pr(z ≤ −µ+ 1
2
(ρσ2) + p1)
=
p1 + Z − µ+ 12(ρσ2)
2Z
(1.20)
Therefore, the objective function of the first period is
Π = p1xˆ
E
1 (p1) + PCA(p1)ΠI(µ, σ) + PCB(p1)ΠU (µ, ρ, σ) (1.21)
where xˆE1 (p1) = E[xˆ1] =
1
2
(
2µ− ρσ2 − 2p1).
The next Proposition states the solution to the intertemporal problem:
Proposition 4. The first-period equilibrium price is
p∗1 =
2Zµ− Zρσ2 −ΠI(µ, σ) + ΠU (µ, ρ, σ)
4Z
In principle, negative first-period prices are allowed: the firm maximizes the overall profit without
imposing the non-negativity of the profits in each period. It is worth noting that the first-period
equilibrium price is decreasing in the risk-aversion coefficient: directly because of the effect of
ρ on the expected market share of the first period, and indirectly because of its effect on the
profits when the information cannot be disclosed.
Previously, I mentioned that Z had to be large enough. At this stage, I can be more concrete:
Z has to be such that both the probability of being in the Corner A and the probability of being
in the Corner B belong to the interval (0, 1). The two figures below represent the overall profit
Π as a function of p1.
Chapter 1. Switching Costs Monopoly 15
Figure 1.1: First-period equilibrium price
To conclude the section, it is interesting to check if the bargain-then-ripoff pattern of prices can
be reversed when information is disclosed: in this case, the switching cost disappears because
the consumers face no uncertainty anymore; however, the quality can be low enough to more
than offset this positive effect on the second-period price. Notice that for the pattern of prices
to be reversed, a necessary condition is p∗1 > 0: if the price is negative in the first period, the
pattern cannot be reversed because in the worst case the monopolist charges a price equal to
zero in the second period. The next Proposition states the thresholds of the qualities for this
reversion to take place:
Proposition 5. The bargain-then-ripoff pattern of prices is reversed when information is dis-
closed in the following cases:
5.1 If 0 < p∗1 < 1, when q¯ < 2p∗1
5.2 If p∗1 ≥ 1, when q¯ < p∗1 + 1.
The result of the reversion of the bargain-then-ripoff pattern is natural in this framework: the
first-period price is based on the weighted average of all the future possibilities, good and bad
outcomes. However, once the outcome is realized and everybody gathers the information through
direct experience, two different effects happen: first, the uncertainty disappears and the con-
sumers’ willingness to pay increases; second, the true quality is revealed. If the quality is high
enough, both effects work in the same direction and the model predicts the classical bargain-
then-ripoff pattern of prices. Nevertheless, if the quality is low, the consumers’ willingness to
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pay decreases; furthermore, if the quality is sufficiently low, this effect more than offsets the
positive effect on the willingness to pay of the lack of uncertainty. Thus, the bargain-then-ripoff
pattern does not hold anymore in these cases.
Notice also that, for the reversion to take place, we need strictly positive first-period prices,
because in the second period the negative prices are dominated.
The reversion of the classical pattern of prices does not imply that the price set in the first period
in a market with switching costs is higher compared to the first-period price set in market without
switching costs. The next section addresses this question.
1.5 The Model Without Risk Aversion
The model without risk aversion is totally analogous to the one solved in the two previous sec-
tions: simply, we have to fix ρ = 0. Therefore,
1. The Lemma 1 also holds
2. The probability of the Corner A is (−1−p1 +µ+Z)/2Z and the probability of the Corner
B is (p1 − µ+ Z)/2Z
3. The prices and the market shares in the full information case are identical to those stated
in Proposition 1
4. The prices and the market shares when information cannot be disclosed are
pU2 =
{
µ/2 µ < 2
µ− 1 µ ≥ 2
xU2 =
{
µ/2 µ < 2
1 µ ≥ 2
Notice that the prices and the market shares when the information cannot be disclosed and the
consumers are risk-neutral are always higher than the corresponding prices and market shares
when the information cannot be disclosed but the consumers are risk-averse: simply, the risk
does not have to be compensated. Then, the profits obtained in this corner are also higher when
ρ = 0 than when ρ > 0. The profits in the full-information case does not change with respect to
the previous sections.
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The next Proposition establishes the first-period equilibrium price when the consumers are
risk-neutral and its relationship with the first-period equilibrium price when the consumers are
risk-averse:
Proposition 6. When the consumers are risk-neutral, it holds that
6.1 The first-period equilibrium price is
p∗1,rn =
2Zµ−ΠI(µ, σ) + ΠrnU (µ)
4Z
where ΠrnU (µ) is µ
2/4 when µ < 2 and µ−1 otherwise, and ΠI(µ, σ) is defined as in (1.17).
6.2 The first-period equilibrium price is always larger than the first-period equilibrium price
when the consumers are risk-averse
The first part of the Proposition is simply the solution to the intertemporal problem of the
firm when consumers are risk-neutral. The second part states that, in the monopoly case, the
classical intuition about the behavior of the firm also holds when the switching costs derive from
the uncertainty about the quality of the product: the monopolist has incentives to set a lower
price in the first period in the presence of switching costs. The intuition here is that, in the
first place, consumers do not have to be compensated for the risk in the first period when they
are risk-neutral, so only the expected quality matters; in the second place, because of the same
reason, the profits obtained when the information cannot be disclosed in the second period are
always higher when the consumers are risk-neutral. Therefore, in equilibrium the monopolist
sets a higher price when the consumers are risk-neutral than when they are risk-averse.
The previous reasoning is reflected in the mathematical expressions of the first-period equilib-
rium prices. First, observe that the risk-aversion parameter ρ affects negatively to the price
in Proposition 4 but that it does not appear in the price in Proposition 6. Second, the price
depends positively on the profits when the information cannot be disclosed (and these profits
also depend negatively on the risk-aversion parameter).
1.6 Conclusion and Discussion
I have presented a monopolistic model of two periods in which the consumers are risk-averse
and switching costs arise endogenously due to the lack of information about the quality of the
traded product. When information is revealed, we can differentiate between two effects: first,
the uncertainty disappears and the consumers’ willingness to pay increases; second, the true
quality of the product is revealed and the consumers’ willingness to pay increases only for high
qualities (and decreases otherwise).
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Depending on the realization of a random variable in the first period, the information of the
quality can be disclosed to the entire market, disclosed only to a share of the market, or not
disclosed at all. Of course, the strategies adopted by the monopolist in the second period are
different for each one of the outcomes. Concretely, the firm charges a price increasing in the
quality when the information is disclosed to the entire market, it charges a price decreasing in
the risk-aversion coefficient when the information was not disclosed, and there is no separating
equilibrium when the information is disclosed only to a share of the market. The equilibrium
price of the first period is calculated by backward induction.
The model answers two questions. First, if the classical bargain-then-ripoff pattern of prices
predicted by most of the models of two periods with switching costs can be reversed with this
type of switching costs. Second, if the first-period price set in a market with switching costs is
lower than the first-period price set in a market without switching costs.
The answer to the first question is affirmative, and actually it is natural in this environment
because the first-period price is calculated using the expectation of the future outcomes (that is,
good and bad outcomes are weighted by their probabilities). When the information is disclosed
to the entire market, the two effects described in the previous paragraph take place. If the
quality of the product is low enough, this effect can be sufficiently strong to lead the monopolist
to set a price in the second period below the first-period equilibrium price.
The answer to the second question is affirmative too: although the classical pattern of prices can
be reversed, the first-period price charged in the presence of switching costs is still lower than the
first-period price charged in a market without switching cost. In the classical models, this result
happens because the firm correctly anticipates the higher profits of the second period when con-
sumers face switching costs and it has an incentive to compete fiercely in the first period. In this
case, the logic is slightly different: if information is disclosed to the entire market, the expected
profits are the same with and without switching costs (with switching costs uncertainty does not
exist, and without switching costs the uncertainty is not penalized); however, if the information
cannot be disclosed at all, the profits when the consumers are risk-averse are smaller than when
they are risk-neutral, precisely because of the penalization of the uncertainty. In other words,
when consumers are risk-neutral, the alternative of not disclosing the information is ”not as
bad” as it is when consumers are risk-averse. Then, the monopolist has a stronger incentive to
disclose information when the consumers are risk-averse, and it increases the probability of this
event by decreasing the price in the first period.
Let me discuss two assumptions of the model.
First, it sounds weird that in a model of switching costs a single firm supplies to the entire
market: at the end, if there is no other firm, how could the consumers switch their supplier? In
this model, the consumers have unitary demands, but they also have the option of not acquiring
the good. In this sense, the outside option of not buying the good works as a riskless and costless
alternative: the consumers know that they will obtain a utility of zero if they do not buy, but
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they face the risk of the uncertainty, and this is penalized in their utility levels: that is why the
demand is zero if consumers are very risk-averse. A particular feature of this ”competition” is
that the outside option do not charge any price, so those consumers who did not gathered the
information through direct experience only have one signal (price) in the second period to infer
the quality of the product.
Second, it is important to remark that the mean-variance analysis is optimal when the consumers
have exponential preferences and the random variable (in this case, the quality) is normally
distributed. The assumption does not create big problems when the information is disclosed to
the entire market and when the information cannot be disclosed to any consumer. However, it
is the reason of the non-existence of a separating equilibrium when only some consumers have
direct information: the infinitesimal distance between qualities is not the problem, the problem
is that the support of the quality is (−∞,+∞) and it is always profitable to mimic the strategy
of a sufficiently large quality unless all consumers are perfectly informed. This result contrasts
with the classical result obtained when there are only two qualities, high and low: in this case,
there exists a separating equilibrium and prices are not distorted when the fraction of directly
informed consumers is large enough (although it is not 1). However, if we assume only two
qualities the mean-variance analysis is not optimal anymore and the endogenous switching costs
would not appear. Nevertheless, the non-existence of the separating equilibrium is not a big
deal when solving the intertemporal problem, because the probability of the interior event does
not depend on the first-period price (thus, with or without equilibrium in the interior case, the
optimal first-period price would not change).
Chapter 2
Better the Devil you Know: A
Dynamic Duopoly Model with
Switching Costs
2.1 Introduction
Switching costs are simply the costs faced by a consumer when switching from her current sup-
plier to a new one. Classic examples of markets with switching costs are airlines, software, car
insurances, cell phones and bank deposits1.
In a market with switching costs, products that were ex-ante homogeneous become ex-post het-
erogeneous. Because of this, the consumer is partially forced to continue using the product she
initially selected. However, the definition of switching costs is pretty general and does not pro-
vide any information about the origin of the switching cost. According to Klemperer (1995), ”a
switching cost results from a consumer’s desire for compatibility between her current purchase
and a previous investment”. Therefore, there are switching costs related to compatibility with
the existing equipment, transaction costs, the cost of learning and the uncertainty about the
quality of untested brands. Notice that the switching costs are not always expressed in monetary
terms: if a consumer wants to move her savings from her old bank to a new one, she will probably
have to pay a cancellation fee (transaction cost measured in money); but if a consumer wants to
use a different operating system in her computer, she has to spend some time in understanding
how it works (learning cost measured in time).
Regardless of whether it is a monetary cost or not, the switching costs make the alternative
offered by the initial supplier relatively less costly than the alternative offered by rivals. There-
fore, its existence affects the market equilibrium prices. It is very well-known that, in models
of two periods with switching costs, firms have incentives to decrease prices in the first period
1The interested reader can check Honka (2013) for an empirical analysis of the switching costs in the U.S.
auto insurance industry, and Shy (2002) for data about the switching costs of the Israeli cellular phone market
and the Finnish market for bank deposits.
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(investment effect) and to increase prices in the second period (harvesting effect). It is said that
prices display a bargain-then-ripoff pattern: in the second period, the firms take advantage of
the captive consumers and set a high price; but, anticipating the large profit of the second pe-
riod, firms compete fiercely in the first period by decreasing their prices in order to get as many
captive consumers as possible. These two effects also appear in models of more than two periods,
although not so clearly separated: when firms compete over a long time horizon, at every period
they want to attract new customers at the same time that they exploit the old captive customers.
The literature has studied which of the two effects dominates; in other words, whether switching
costs make markets more or less competitive in the average. The conventional wisdom states
that the harvesting effect dominates and, therefore, the switching costs increase the average
price (Klemperer (1987b); Farrell and Klemperer (2007)). However, this result has been chal-
lenged several times. For instance, Doganoglu (2010) shows that, if price discrimination among
consumers is not allowed, in a duopoly market with competition in an infinite horizon with
experience goods the steady state equilibrium prices are lower with small switching costs than
with no switching costs. Cabral (2012) also assumes a duopoly in an infinite-horizon model, but
he allows for price discrimination between locked-in and not locked-in consumers. Contrary to
Doganoglu, Cabral ’s analysis goes beyond the case of small switching costs. He provides condi-
tions for switching costs to be pro-competitive or anti-competitive. In concrete, he shows that
switching costs decrease equilibrium prices in markets where both firms have approximately the
same chance of attracting a consumer. In the same spirit, Rhodes (2013) analyzes a wide range
of switching costs. In addition, he differentiates between the effects of the switching costs in the
short-run and in the long-run in an infinite-horizon model with discrete time. His main finding
is that, although switching cost can be pro-competitive or anti-competitive in the long-run, they
are more likely to be anti-competitive in the short-run. Fabra and Garcia (2012) also differen-
tiate between the short-run and the long-run, but they analyze a problem with continuous time
in which only a random fraction of consumers considers switching in an infinitesimal amount
of time. They show that the effect of the switching costs in equilibrium depends critically on
the asymmetries of the market shares: if they are asymmetric enough, larger switching costs
lead to higher prices; as market shares become symmetric, price competition turns fiercer and
the overall effect is pro-competitive. Arie and Grieco (2012) relax the duopoly assumption and
identify an additional effect for small switching costs to be pro-competitive in the short-term: if
consumers switch in equilibrium, firms may want to decrease prices to partially offset the cost
of consumers who are switching (compensation effect). Pearcy (2011) also considers the general
case of n firms and concludes that, with a sufficiently large number of firms, the equilibrium
prices are lower in the presence of switching costs.
All these papers have something in common: the switching cost is an additive term in the utility
function that appears after consuming the product offered by a certain brand. Therefore, they
are in line with the wide definition of switching costs discussed previously. My proposal consists
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in focusing on switching costs derived from the uncertainty about the quality of untested brands.
I construct a duopoly model of two periods in which the firms live during the entire game. Firm
A is located at point 0 of the unit interval, and the quality of its product is a random variable
normally distributed with mean larger than zero. Firm B is located at point 1 of the unit inter-
val, and it is common knowledge during the entire game that its product is of quality zero. Firms
compete simultaneously in prices in each period; furthermore, price commitment is not possible
and price discrimination across consumers in the same period is not allowed. Neither firms nor
consumers can observe the quality of the product supplied by A before setting the first-period
prices. In the first period, there is a mass 1 of consumers uniformly distributed along the unit
interval. The utility function is positively related to the expected quality of the product, but
negatively related to the uncertainty about that quality because consumers are assumed to be
risk-averse. Therefore, in the first period we can differentiate between two effects: expected
quality effect and switching cost effect. These two effects are natural and reasonable when we
give a deeper structure to the switching costs: information reduces uncertainty, but also reveals
the quality of the product. The expected quality effect works in the first period in favor of firm
A, because its expected quality is larger than zero; however, the switching cost effect works in
the first period in favor of firm B, because its quality is common knowledge and there is no
uncertainty when buying its product (uncertainty that exists when buying the product of A).
If the firm A supplied (at least partially) to the market in the first period, both firms observe
the true quality q¯A after consumption choices. In the second period, there is a new mass 1 of
consumers uniformly distributed along the unit interval. All consumers can observe the past
market shares. The individual located at point xi in the second period inherits the information
gathered by the inhabitant located at xi in the first period: if the previous inhabitant acquired
the product supplied by A, she learns the true quality q¯A. Nevertheless, also both firms know
the true quality of the product offered by A and the prices are signals used to infer the quality
by those consumers who did not gather information through direct experience in the second
period2, eliminating the faced switching cost. The consumers who have information from direct
experience do not consider the prices as signals because they cannot be deceived.
Depending on the market shares of the first period, I can distinguish three situations: (a) the
firm A was the single supplier, (b) the firm B was the single supplier, and (c) both firms A and
B supplied to a positive share of the market. If the firm A was the single supplier in the first
period, all the agents in the second period are fully informed; equilibrium prices do not depend
on the risk-aversion coefficient and are not distorted. If the firm B was the single supplier in
the first period, q¯A remains unknown for all the agents; the equilibrium price of B is increasing
on the risk-aversion coefficient whereas the price of A is decreasing on it and, furthermore, the
price charged by B is higher than the price charged by A if the risk-aversion coefficient is above
a certain threshold. If both firms supplied to a positive share in the first period, a separating
2Prices of the first period do not convey any relevant information about the quality qA because its true
realization is unknown for all the agents when first-period prices are fixed.
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equilibrium does not exist. Compared with the situation without switching costs, the equilib-
rium of the situation (a) is exactly the same, and again a separating equilibrium does not exist
in the situation (c). However, prices would not depend on the risk-aversion coefficient in the
equilibrium of the situation (b), and the price charged by the firm A would always be larger
than the price charged by the firm B.
In the first period, I show that the price set by firm A is decreasing in the risk-aversion co-
efficient, whereas the price set by firm B is increasing in this parameter. Even more, I show
that the (expected) average first-period price in the problem with switching cost can be larger
than in the problem without switching costs. This contrasts with the classic result of lower
first-period prices in the presence of switching costs, but it is due to the nature of the switching
costs considered here. This result happens because, given the expected quality, the firm that
offers the riskless product has a competitive advantage in the first period when consumers are
sufficiently risk averse that does not exist when consumers are risk neutral. It may happen that
its rival cannot compensate completely this advantage through a price decrease because negative
prices are dominated.
As can be noticed from the previous discussion, the switching costs arise endogenously from the
consumer’s history of consumption. A relevant study which also considers endogenous switching
costs is Villas-Boas (2006). A key difference between our approaches is that signaling plays
no role in his model: instead of being uncertain about the quality, consumers are uncertain
about their valuation of a certain good. This information about their own preferences can only
be gathered after experiencing a certain product. After testing a product, a consumer has
more information about it than about other products, and this is translated into an informa-
tional advantage that the firms can exploit. Of course, the larger the market share today, the
larger the informational advantage tomorrow. The author considers this kind of competition in
an infinite-horizon framework in a duopoly market with overlapping generations of consumers.
Two effects arise: forward-looking consumers realize that current consumption choices will affect
future prices; forward-looking firms realize that they gain in the future from having a greater
market share today. The first effect results in higher equilibrium prices, whereas the second
effect results in lower equilibrium prices. When discount factors are similar for consumers and
firms, the former effect dominates and prices increase in the informational advantages.
An interesting feature of the switching cost that derives from the lack of information is that
they could be eliminated through credible signals. For instance, a software firm cannot reduce
the time that a consumer has to invest to learn how its program works most of the times; but
if the cost derives from the uncertainty about the quality of the product, the firm can save this
cost to consumers by sending a credible signal. Therefore, this paper also contributes to the
literature on signaling. Bagwell and Riordan (1991) study the signaling problem of a monopolist
in a dynamic environment. The authors claim that high prices are efficient means of signaling,
because the derived loss of profits is more harmful for low-quality products. Their main finding
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is that, as time goes by and the amount of informed consumers increases, the signaling distor-
tion decreases. In my model, that result does not hold because of the continuum of qualities:
distortion is not profitable and it can be shown that, for some sets of qualities, at least one of
the firms wants to deviate when some consumers do not have full information. Hertzendorf and
Overgaard (2001) study a signaling static problem in a vertically differentiated duopoly. The
nature randomly assigns one firm to be the high-quality firm and the other to be the low-quality
firm. Firms have two signaling tools: advertising levels and prices. The authors conclude that
pure price separation is impossible if the vertical differentiation is small: dissipative advertising
plays a role and ensures the existence of a separating equilibrium in this case. They also in-
troduce two equilibrium refinements to deal with the multi-sender nature of the game. Bester
and Demuth (2011) analyze a duopoly problem with vertical and horizontal differentiation. As
it happens in my model, the firms may differ in their qualities; however, they only consider two
qualities: high and low. One of the firms is known to be of low quality, whereas the other can be
high or low. As I do, they assume that there is a share of consumers who know both qualities,
but in their approach these consumers are randomly located in the unit interval: that is why
their problem does not show the corners that appear in mine, in which the informed consumers
are located in a compact set at the beginning of the unit interval. The consumers who do not
have full information take the market prices as signals, and the problem is then characterized by
a signaling rivalry. They find that the only sustainable equilibrium is separating, with no dis-
torted prices, and takes place when there is a sufficiently large proportion of consumers informed
about the two qualities (this proportion depends on the distance between the high and the low
quality). The main difference between their approach and mine is the number of qualities: with
two, the deviations are defined and the authors can define the out-of-equilibrium beliefs; in my
problem, all prices are part of the equilibrium support. Also, they assume risk-neutral con-
sumers instead of risk-averse consumers, although I find that the result of no existence of my
model also holds for risk-neutral consumers. Finally, Janssen and Roy (2010) relax the duopoly
assumption and consider competition among n firms in a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly where
products can differ only in their quality. A key assumption is that each firm’s product quality
level is private information (that is, unknown for consumers and rivals). Even in this type of
competition, the firms signal their quality through prices. The authors determine that there is
no fully revealing equilibrium in pure strategies, but that there exist symmetric fully revealing
perfect Bayesian equilibria in which high-quality firms charge a deterministic price and low-
quality firms randomize over an interval of prices. Furthermore, there is a unique symmetric
fully revealing equilibrium satisfying the D1 criterion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the model is presented in Section 2, and its solution
is derived in Sections 3 and 4. In Section 5, I compare the equilibrium prices of the two firms
with respect to a situation without switching costs. I conclude in Section 6 by discussing the
role of some assumptions and providing some lines for future research.
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2.2 The Model
Consider a model of two periods. There are two firms, A and B, located at the extreme points
of the unit interval (xA = 0 and xB = 1). They sell a non-storable good in each one of the
two periods and all production costs are normalized to zero. The two firms live during the
entire game and have a discount factor equal to 1. They compete simultaneously in prices in
each period, such that price commitment and price discrimination across consumers living in
the same period are not allowed. However, the charged prices in the first and second period can
be different.
There is a mass 1 of risk-averse consumers uniformly distributed along the unit interval in each
period (horizontal differentiation); that is, consumers of the first period are different from con-
sumers of the second period. Nevertheless, a consumer located at point xi in the second period
inherits the information gathered by the consumer located at her position in the first period. It
is reasonable to assume this because the evidence states that people learn from the experience
of others. I consider that the market has to be fully covered: each consumer buys either one
unit of the product offered by A or one unit of the product offered by B.
The traded good has two dimensions: quality and color. Quality remains constant during the
entire game, whereas the color can be changed across periods.
The quality of the product supplied by the firm F = {A,B} is denoted by qF . The color of the
product supplied by the firm F = {A,B} in period t = {1, 2} is denoted by ctF . All consumers
prefer the same color, but this information is unknown for the firms in the first period (private
information of the consumers). The consumers observe the color offered by each brand before
making their consumption choices.
In the same spirit of vertical differentiation, the consumers have monotonic preferences with
respect to the quality of the products. It is common knowledge that the quality of the product
supplied by the firm B is zero: qB = 0. In the first period, the quality of the product supplied
by the firm A is unknown and all the agents assume the following:
Assumption 3. The quality of the product supplied by the firm A is a random variable nor-
mally distributed with mean µ > 0 and variance σ2:
qA ∼ N(µ, σ)
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The timing of the game is as follows:
Period 1
· The quality of the product offered by A, qA, is realized and stays constant during the
entire game. At this stage, it is unknown for all the agents.
· Each firm decides the color of its product.
· Firms set the first-period prices p1 = (p1A, p1B) simultaneously.
· Consumers make their consumption choices: those who acquire the product offered
by A observe the realization q¯A. Agents receive their first-period payoffs.
Period 2
· All agents observe the first-period market shares. The two firms undertake some
market research to observe q¯A if the market share of A in the first period was strictly
positive.
· Each firm decides the color of its product.
· Consumer located at xi in the first period communicates her experience to the con-
sumer located at xi in the second period. Then, the first-period consumer leaves the
market.
· Consumers of the second period are divided in two groups: fully informed (denoted
by the superscript I) and partially informed (denoted by the superscript P ).
· Firms set the second-period prices p2 = (p2A, p2B) simultaneously.
· Partially informed consumers use the vector of prices and the first-period market
shares to update their beliefs.
· Consumers make their consumption choices and all agents receive their second-period
payoffs.
The framework of a known quality and an uncertain quality reflects a situation in which a new
firm enters into the market: if the quality is understood as something more sophisticated, for
instance the perception of the product that the consumers have, the experimentation in the first
period is necessary to gather this information because nobody tested the product before. There-
fore, it also makes sense that this perception cannot be signaled by the firms at the beginning of
the game. I implicitly assume that the two firms undertake some market research at a negligible
cost for them to learn about the consumers’ perception of the product whenever possible (that
is, after the first period if the market share of the firm A in that period was strictly positive),
and that the consumers do not have enough resources to undertake the same market research.
Communication among consumers who live in the same period is not allowed.
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Let me explain in detail how the consumers make their consumption choices.
The utility function is exponential. Concretely, the utility of the consumer located at xi derived
from consuming brand F in period t is
ui,t,F = −e−ρ(qF−Ki,t,F ) (2.1)
where ρ > 0 is the risk-aversion coefficient and Ki,t,F is a set of other parameters that can differ
across consumers, periods and brands.
Since the quality of the product supplied by A is assumed to be normally distributed when it is
uncertain, maximize the expected utility of the consumer is equivalent to maximize the certainty
equivalent5:
ui,t,A = µ− 1
2
(ρσ2)−Ki,t,A (2.2)
In other words, the mean-variance analysis is optimal.
The quality of the product supplied by B is known to be zero with certainty during the entire
game. Then,
ui,t,B = −Ki,t,B (2.3)
In the first period,
Ki,1,A = p1A + xi + (ζ − c1A)
Ki,1,B = p1B + (1− xi) + (ζ − c1B)
where p1F ≥ 0 is the price of the brand F in the first period, ζ is the favorite color of the
consumers and c1F is the color of the brand F in the first period. Then, Ki,1,F is interpreted as
the sum of all the costs6 faced by the consumer located at xi derived from acquiring the brand
F in the first period.
Then,
ui,1,A = µ− 1
2
(ρσ2)− p1A − xi − (ζ − c1A) (2.4)
and
ui,1,B = −p1B − (1− xi)− (ζ − c1B) (2.5)
In the first period, the consumers make their consumption decisions and observe the quality of
the tested brand with no error: those who acquire brand B do not learn anything new, but
those who acquire A learn the true realization of the quality q¯A. Before leaving the market in
the second period, the consumer located at point xi communicates the information she gathered
to the consumer who will be located at xi in the second period
7. Notice that this assumption
5A formal proof of this statement can be found in the Appendix.
6The transportation cost parameter is normalized to 1.
7To avoid complexity, I assume that all consumers in the two periods perceive the quality in the same way.
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is technically equivalent to consider myopic consumers, but the interpretation is quite different:
what I mean here is that consumers learn from the experience of others.
Since consumers of the first period communicate their experience to the consumers of the second
period but do not internalize their future utility, the marginal consumer of the first period xˆ1 is
obtained by equalizing the equations (2.4) and (2.5):
xˆ1 =
1
4
(
2− 2p1A + 2p1B + 2µ− ρσ2 + 2(c1A − c1B)
)
=
1
4
(
2− 2p1A + 2p1B + 2µ− ρσ2 + 2(∆c1)
) (2.6)
Notice three things from equation (2.6): first, the term µ/2 represents the quality effect and
works in favor of firm A since µ > 0; second, the term −ρσ2/4 is the switching cost effect and
works in favor of firm B; and third, the marginal consumer of the first period is actually a random
variable for the firms. The reason of the third remark is that the term ∆c1 is consumers’ private
information. Then, firms think about it as a random variable when solving their maximization
problems. Since there are infinitely many colors, it is reasonable to assume the following:
Assumption 4. The firms consider ∆c1 as a random variable uniformly distributed with zero
mean:
∆c1 ∼ U(−C,C)
with C large enough.
The direct implication of this assumption is that we can have corner solutions in the first period.
Concretely, depending on the value of ∆c1, there are three possibilities: all consumers acquire
the brand A in the first period and all consumers will be fully informed in the second period; all
consumers acquire the brand B in the first period and all consumers will be partially informed in
the second period; and only some consumers acquire brand A in the first period and the market
will be divided into fully informed consumers and partially informed consumers in the second
period.
The right way to interpret the corner solutions is as follows: since the size of the market is lim-
ited, a mathematical result of xˆ1 > 1 means that all the consumers acquire the brand A and that
all of them obtain a strictly positive surplus. Analogously, a mathematical result of xˆ1 < 0 means
that all the consumers acquire the brand B and that all of them obtain a strictly positive surplus.
Chapter 2. Switching Costs Duopoly 29
I assume that all the agents observe the first-period market shares8. This is crucial for two
reasons. For firms, the first-period market shares reveal which one of the two offered colors was
closer to the favorite color of the consumers, ζ. Then, in the second period the two firms offer
the same color c2A = c2B = c2 and the difference between the favorite color and the offered color
is not relevant anymore to determine the marginal consumer. For consumers, it is important to
know the amount of fully informed people to determine the truthfulness of the prices.
Then, in the second period,
Ki,2,A = p2A + xi + (ζ − c2)
Ki,2,B = p2B + (1− xi) + (ζ − c2)
In the second period, consumers are divided into two groups: fully informed and partially in-
formed. The fully informed consumers are those who learn the quality of the brand A through
the experience of the individuals living in their positions in period 1; the partially informed
consumers are those who do not have the information about the quality of A because the indi-
viduals living in their positions in period 1 did not acquire that brand and, therefore, use the
second-period prices to infer the quality of A.
The utility of a fully informed consumer located at xi in the second period when she acquires
the product offered by A is
uIi,2,A = q¯A − p2A − xi − (ζ − c2) (2.7)
Notice that the uncertainty has disappeared and that the consumer uses the true realization of
the quality instead of the expected quality.
Denoting the vector of prices of the second period by p2 = (p2A, p2B), the utility of a partially
informed consumer located at xi in the second period when she acquires the product offered by
A is
uPi,2,A = E[qA|(p2, xˆ1)]−
1
2
ρV ar[qA|(p2, xˆ1)]− p2A − xi − (ζ − c2) (2.8)
The utility of a consumer located at xi in the second period when she acquires the product
offered by B is
ui,2,B = −p2B − (1− xi)− (ζ − c2) (2.9)
The utility derived from consuming the brand B does not differ across fully informed and par-
tially informed consumers because its quality is common knowledge.
8As it is argued in Caminal and Vives (1996), it is more plausible that the consumers observe the past market
shares instead of the vector of past prices.
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The marginal consumer in the second period among the fully informed consumers is obtained
by equalizing the equations (2.7) and (2.9):
xI2 =
1
2
(1− p2A + p2B + q¯A) (2.10)
And the marginal consumer in the second period among the partially informed consumers is
obtained by equalizing the equations (2.8) and (2.9):
xP2 =
1
2
(
1− p2A + p2B + E[qA|(p2, xˆ1)]− 1
2
ρV ar[qA|(p2, xˆ1)]
)
(2.11)
Because of the communication between the consumers who live in the first period and the
consumers who live in the second period, it is not optimal for the firms to solve the problem of
each period separately: since they are forward-looking, the game has to be solved by backward
induction. The equilibrium concept used is the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBNE).
2.3 Equilibrium of the Second Period
There may be three possible situations in the first period, depending on the value of ∆c1: all
consumers acquire the brand A (xˆ1 ≥ 1), all consumers acquire the brand B (xˆ1 ≤ 0) and some
consumers acquired the brand A whereas the rest acquire the brand B (xˆ1 ∈ (0, 1)). The optimal
pricing strategy in the second period depends on the outcome of the first period.
2.3.1 Corner Equilibria
Corner A
This corner takes place when all consumers acquired the brand A in the first period, that is,
when
xˆ1 ≥ 1⇔ ∆c1 ≥ 1 + p1A − p1B − µ+ 1
2
ρσ2 (2.12)
In this case, all consumers of the first period tested the brand A and this information is commu-
nicated to all the consumers of the second period. Then, all the agents know the true realization
of the quality of the product offered by the firm A, q¯A and we say that the market is fully
informed (remember that it is common knowledge that the quality of the product offered by the
firm B is zero).
Since no consumer is susceptible to be deceived through the prices, signaling plays no role in
this case. Thus, the marginal consumer is the one defined in equation (2.10).
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The Proposition below states the equilibrium prices and market shares:
Proposition 7. The equilibrium prices and market shares in the case of full information are as
follows:
pI2A =

0 q¯A ≤ −3
1 + q¯A3 q¯A ∈ (−3, 3)
q¯A − 1 q¯A ≥ 3
pI2B =

−q¯A − 1 q¯A ≤ −3
1− q¯A3 q¯A ∈ (−3, 3)
0 q¯A ≥ 3
xI2 =

0 q¯A ≤ −3
3+q¯A
6 q¯A ∈ (−3, 3)
1 q¯A ≥ 3
As expected, the price fixed by A and its market share are increasing in the realization of the
quality of the product that it supplies. In the same way, the price fixed by B and its market
share are decreasing in the realization of the quality of the product supplied by A. Notice that
the thresholds are ”arbitrary”: we could fix the quality of the product supplied by the firm B at
a level different from zero and still get the two corners and the interior solution, but in that case
the prices would depend on the differential between the qualities of A and B and the thresholds
for each outcome would be different.
The corner outcomes mean that the differential among qualities is big enough for one of the
firms to supply to the entire market.
It is worth remarking that these prices are not distorted, because all second-period consumers
have complete information derived from the experience of the first-period consumers.
Corner B
In this corner, all the consumers acquired the product supplied by the firm B in the first period.
Since the sales of the product supplied by A were zero, the firms cannot undertake the market
research to discover how consumers perceive the product A; then, I will say that the information
about the quality of A cannot be disclosed.
Mathematically, this corner takes place when
xˆ1 ≤ 0⇔ ∆c1 ≤ −1 + p1A − p1B − µ+ 1
2
ρσ2 (2.13)
In this case, nobody bought the product supplied by A in the first period and the true realization
q¯A is unknown for the firms. The consumers observe the past market shares and know that the
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firms cannot send any signal about the uncertain quality through the prices. Therefore, the
consumers do not update their beliefs and simply take the unconditional values for the mean
and the variance. Thus, the equation (2.11) describing the marginal consumer becomes into
xP2 =
1
2
(
1− p2A + p2B + µ− 1
2
ρσ2
)
(2.14)
The next Proposition establishes the equilibrium prices and market shares when the information
about the quality of A cannot be disclosed:
Proposition 8. The equilibrium prices and market shares when the information about the
quality of A cannot be disclosed are as follows:
pP2A =

0 ρ ≥ (6 + 2µ)/σ2
1 + µ3 − ρσ
2
6 µ ≤ 3 and ρ < (6 + 2µ)/σ2; or
µ > 3 and (−6 + 2µ)/σ2 < ρ < (6 + 2µ)/σ2
1
2(−2 + 2µ− ρσ2) µ > 3 and ρ ≤ (−6 + 2µ)/σ2
pP2B =

1
2(−2− 2µ+ ρσ2) ρ ≥ (6 + 2µ)/σ2
1− µ3 + ρσ
2
6 µ ≤ 3 and ρ < (6 + 2µ)/σ2; or
µ > 3 and (−6 + 2µ)/σ2 < ρ < (6 + 2µ)/σ2
0 µ > 3 and ρ ≤ (−6 + 2µ)/σ2
xP2 =

0 ρ ≥ (6 + 2µ)/σ2
1
12(6 + 2µ− ρσ2) µ ≤ 3 and ρ < (6 + 2µ)/σ2; or
µ > 3 and (−6 + 2µ)/σ2 < ρ < (6 + 2µ)/σ2
1 µ > 3 and ρ ≤ (−6 + 2µ)/σ2
This equilibrium shows interesting features. Since all agents in the market are partially informed,
the firm B takes advantage of the switching cost: its equilibrium price is increasing in the
risk-aversion coefficient, whereas the equilibrium price of the rival firm A is decreasing in it.
Nevertheless, the quality effect is favorable to firm A because µ > 0. These two effects exactly
offset each other when ρ = 2µ/σ2: in this case, the two firms charge the same price and the
market splits up equally. If the risk-aversion coefficient is above this threshold, the switching
cost dominates: despite consumers know that the quality offered by B is zero, they consider too
risky to test the product of A without additional information. Therefore, the firm B charges a
price larger than its rival in equilibrium and it supplies to a higher share of the market. Exactly
the opposite takes place when the risk-aversion coefficient is below the threshold: the quality
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effect dominates and consumers prefer to take the risk of testing the brand for which they have
no information. In this case, the price charged by the firm A is higher than the price charged
by B, and A supplies to a higher share of the market. For extreme values of ρ, only one of the
two firms supplies to the entire market.
2.3.2 Interior Equilibrium
In the interior equilibrium, only some consumers tested the product supplied by A in the first
period. This means that there is a fraction of consumers who do not take the prices as a signals
of the quality, but the rest of the consumers do (and actually, they are susceptible of being
deceived).
Contrary to the monopoly case, the partially informed consumers have two signals to update
their beliefs about the quality of the product supplied by A (the price charged by A and the
price charged by B). Then, this game is characterized by the ”signaling rivalry”.
In the signaling games, there may be three different types of equilibria: separating, pooling
and semi-pooling (also known as semi-separating). In this paper, I check the existence or not
of a separating equilibrium. In a separating equilibrium with two senders, the consumers can
infer with no error the quality of the product A for each vector of prices. This implies that the
messages sent by the two firms have to be consistent.
Suppose that the full-information prices can be supported as a signaling equilibrium under ad-
ditional conditions. If the consumers could only observe one of the prices, the inference could be
incomplete. For instance, if the firm A charges a zero price, the partially informed consumers
can only infer that q¯A ≤ −3. The information would be complete with the price charged by B:
if p2B = 4, the partially informed consumers can infer that q¯A = −5. It is worth remarking that
the two messages do not conflict, so the consumers can infer the quality of A perfectly. However,
if the price vector is (4, 4), the consumers would be confused: the price charged by A signals
q¯A = 5, whereas the price charged by B signals q¯A = −5. At most, the consumers would infer
that the true quality belongs to the interval [−5, 5], but they do not know if A, B or both are
deviating from the equilibrium price.
The informed consumers do not take the prices as a signal because they know the true quality
of the product. Then, the demands from this sector can be expressed as
DI2A = min
{
xˆ1,max
{
0,
1
2
(1− p2A + p2B + q¯A)
}}
DI2B = xˆ1 −DI2A
(2.15)
The operators min and max come from the corners of the problem: the marginal consumer
among the informed consumers cannot be part of the uninformed group, and negative demands
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are not allowed.
The partially informed consumers use the market shares of the period 1 and the vector of prices
of the period 2 to update their beliefs. Then, the demands from this sector can be expressed as
DP2A = max
{
0,min
{
1,
1
2
(
1− p2A + p2B + q˘A − 1
2
ρs2
)}
− xˆ1
}
DP2B = max
{
0, 1−max
{
xˆ1,
1
2
(
1− p2A + p2B + q˘A − 1
2
ρs2
)}} (2.16)
where σ2 > s2 ≥ 0 represents the updated uncertainty and q˘A represents the updated quality
when the observed vector of prices is (p2A, p2B) and the market share of the firm A in the first
period was xˆ1 > 0. s
2 = 0 when the two prices would signal the same quality q¯A and, in general,
q˘A would be a linear combination of the qualities signaled by each one of the prices.
The profits of each firm are
pi2A = p2A
(
DI2A +D
P
2A
)
pi2B = p2B
(
DI2B +D
P
2B
) (2.17)
Notice that the firms face a trade-off when they pretend to signal a quality that is not the true
one: by increasing the price, the updated quality and uncertainty of the partially informed con-
sumers are affected and this strategy may generate extra profits; however, the demand in the
informed sector decreases.
Proposition 9. A separating equilibrium may not exist.
Consider q¯A = 4. If the information is disclosed, the firm B makes exactly zero profits. Then,
it is at least as good as if, for instance, it would signal a quality of q¯A = −4 through a positive
price independently of the consumers beliefs (the profit has a lower bound in zero). In the same
way, if q¯A = −4 and the information is disclosed, the firm A makes exactly zero profits. Then,
it is as least as good as if it would signal a quality of q¯A = 4 through a positive price. It is easy
to see that, if the vector of prices is such that the price of A signals a quality of 4 and the price
of B signals a quality of -4, the consumers could not determine which firm is deviating and they
could not infer the true quality. In other words, the separating equilibrium would not exist.
In principle, the result of non-existence could make impossible to solve the intertemporal max-
imization problem. However, I show in the next section that, under the assumptions of the
model, this is not the case.
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2.4 Equilibrium of the First Period
As it was mentioned in Section 2, the two firms live during the entire game, are forward-looking
and have a discount factor equal to 1. Then, the objective function of the first period is com-
posed of the first-period profits plus the expected second-period profits.
I have shown that a separating equilibrium may not exist in the interior case, which in principle
could be a problem to find the expected profit of the second period. However, the next Lemma
states that this equilibrium is irrelevant when solving the intertemporal maximization problem:
Lemma 2. The probability of being in the interior case in the second period is independent of
the first-period price.
Therefore, in mathematical terms, the equilibrium of the interior case would be like adding a
constant term to the first-period objective function and it would not affect to the solution of the
problem.
The expected profit obtained by each firm in the Corner A depends on the parameters of the
distribution of the product quality, µ and σ:
ΠI2A(µ, σ) = Pr(q¯A ≤ −3)E(0|q¯A ≤ −3) + Pr(q¯A ≥ 3)E(q¯A − 1|q¯A ≥ 3)+
+ Pr(−3 < q¯A < 3)E
(
1
18
(3 + q¯A)
2
∣∣∣∣−3 < q¯A < 3)
= Pr(q¯A ≥ 3)E(q¯A − 1|q¯A ≥ 3) + Pr(−3 < q¯A < 3)E
(
1
18
(3 + q¯A)
2
∣∣∣∣−3 < q¯A < 3)
> 0
(2.18)
ΠI2B(µ, σ) = Pr(q¯A ≤ −3)E(−q¯A − 1|q¯A ≤ −3) + Pr(q¯A ≥ 3)E(0|q¯A ≥ 3)+
+ Pr(−3 < q¯A < 3)E
(
1
18
(3− q¯A)2
∣∣∣∣−3 < q¯A < 3)
= Pr(q¯A ≤ −3)E(−q¯A − 1|q¯A ≤ −3) + Pr(−3 < q¯A < 3)E
(
1
18
(3− q¯A)2
∣∣∣∣−3 < q¯A < 3)
> 0
(2.19)
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And the profit obtained by each firm in the Corner B is defined by the following piecewise
functions:
ΠP2A(µ, ρ, σ) =

0 ρ ≥ (6 + 2µ)/σ2
1
72(6 + 2µ− ρσ2)2 µ ≤ 3 and ρ < (6 + 2µ)/σ2; or
µ > 3 and (−6 + 2µ)/σ2 < ρ < (6 + 2µ)/σ2
1
2(−2 + 2µ− ρσ2) µ > 3 and ρ ≤ (−6 + 2µ)/σ2
(2.20)
ΠP2B(µ, ρ, σ) =

1
2(−2− 2µ+ ρσ2) ρ ≥ (6 + 2µ)/σ2
1
72(6− 2µ+ ρσ2)2 µ ≤ 3 and ρ < (6 + 2µ)/σ2; or
µ > 3 and (−6 + 2µ)/σ2 < ρ < (6 + 2µ)/σ2
0 µ > 3 and ρ ≤ (−6 + 2µ)/σ2
(2.21)
Being p1 = (p1A, p1B) the price vector of the first period, the probability of being in the Corner
A is
PCA(p1) = Pr(∆c1 ≥ 1− µ+ 1
2
ρσ2 + p1A − p1B)
=
−1− p1A + p1B + µ− 12(ρσ2) + C
2C
(2.22)
and the probability of being in the Corner B is
PCB(p1) = Pr(∆c1 ≤ −1− µ+ 1
2
ρσ2 + p1A − p1B)
=
−1 + p1A − p1B − µ+ 12(ρσ2) + C
2C
(2.23)
Therefore, the objective functions of the first period are
ΠA = p1Axˆ
E
1 (p1) + PCA(p1)Π
I
2A(µ, σ) + PCB(p1)Π
P
2A(µ, ρ, σ)
ΠB = p1B(1− xˆE1 (p1)) + PCA(p1)ΠI2B(µ, σ) + PCB(p1)ΠP2B(µ, ρ, σ)
(2.24)
where xˆE1 (p1) = E[xˆ1] = (2− 2p1A + 2p1B + 2µ− ρσ2)/4.
The next Proposition states the solution to the intertemporal problem:
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Proposition 10. The first-period equilibrium prices are
p∗1A =

0 if 0 >
C(6 + 2µ− ρσ2) + 2Π˜
12C
−4ΠI2A + 4ΠP2A + 2ΠI2B − 2ΠP2B + C(6 + 2µ− ρσ2)
6C if 0 <
C(6 + 2µ− ρσ2) + 2Π˜
12C < 1
−2 + 2µ− ρσ2
2 if 1 <
C(6 + 2µ− ρσ2) + 2Π˜
12C
p∗1B =

−2− 2µ+ ρσ2
2 if 0 >
C(6 + 2µ− ρσ2) + 2Π˜
12C
−2ΠI2A + 2ΠP2A + 4ΠI2B − 4ΠP2B + C(6− 2µ+ ρσ2)
6C if 0 <
C(6 + 2µ− ρσ2) + 2Π˜
12C < 1
0 if 1 <
C(6 + 2µ− ρσ2) + 2Π˜
12C
with Π˜ = ΠI2A −ΠP2A + ΠI2B −ΠP2B
It was mentioned previously that C had to be large enough. Concretely,
Assumption 5. C has to be such that
0 < PCA(p∗1) < 1
0 < PCB(p∗1) < 1
and
C > 2
Under the previous assumption, it holds that the first-period price charged by A is decreasing
in the risk-aversion coefficient, whereas the first-period price charged by B is increasing in it.
It is important to remark that negative prices are weakly dominated in the first period, contrary
to what happened in the monopoly case. Take the corner 0 > (C(6 + 2µ− ρσ2) + 2Π˜)/12C (the
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reasoning is analogous for the other corner). In this case, the firm B optimally plays the strategy
p1B = (−2 + 2p1A − 2µ + ρσ2)/2. This means that the firm A will not get additional profits
when charging a negative price: its demand in expected terms is zero in the first period, and the
probability of each corner in the second period when the firm B plays the previous strategy is 1/2.
The figures below represent the overall profit Πj as a function of pj , given the equilibrium price
p∗−j :
Figure 2.1: First-period equilibrium price, corner solution
Figure 2.2: First-period equilibrium price, interior solution
To conclude the section, it is interesting to check if the bargain-then-ripoff pattern of prices can
be reversed when information is disclosed for the two firms simultaneously. From the previous
Chapter, we know that the classical pattern of prices can be reversed when there is a single
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firm in the market, depending on the values of the risk-aversion coefficient and the true quality.
In this case, the effect of the price competition is important too. For the pattern of prices to
be reversed for the two firms simultaneously, a necessary condition is p∗1A > 0 and p
∗
1B > 0: if
the price is zero in the first period, the pattern cannot be reversed because negative prices are
dominated in the second period. The next Proposition states how the patterns of prices evolve
when the information is disclosed:
Proposition 11. If the bargain-then-ripoff pattern is reversed for one of the firms, it cannot be
reversed for the other at the same time.
Notice that the Proposition does not state that the bargain-then-ripoff pattern necessarily re-
verses for one firm: in fact, it may happen that the classical pattern holds for the two firms
simultaneously. It only states that the bargain-then-ripoff pattern cannot be reversed for the
two firms at the same time. Actually, it makes sense: in the first period, the firm B takes advan-
tage of the risk faced by the consumers. When the information is disclosed, this risk disappears
and only the true quality matters. If the quality is sufficiently low (high), the firm B maintains
(loses) its advantage in the market and it sets a higher (lower) price than in the first period.
However, the firm A sets a price lower (higher) than in the first period to compensate (take
advantage of) such a low (high) quality.
2.5 The Model Without Risk Aversion
The model without risk aversion considers risk-neutral consumers; that is, now the risk-aversion
parameter ρ is equal to zero instead of being strictly positive. This new assumption does not
change the way to solve the model. Then,
1. The Lemma 2 also holds
2. The probability of the Corner A is (−1 − p1A + p1B + µ + C)/2C and the probability of
the Corner B is (−1 + p1A − p1B − µ+ C)/2C
3. The prices and the market shares in the full information case are identical to those stated
in Proposition 7
4. The prices and the market shares when information cannot be disclosed are
pP,rn2A =
{
1 + µ3 if µ ≤ 3
(−1 + µ) if µ > 3
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pP,rn2B =
{
1− µ3 if µ ≤ 3
0 if µ > 3
xP,rn2 =
{
1
6(3 + µ) if µ ≤ 3
1 if µ > 3
From these equilibrium prices, it is important to remark two things: first, the prices charged by
the firm A are always higher with risk-neutral consumers than with risk-averse consumers (the
opposite happens for B); second, B never charges a price higher than the price charged by A,
contrary to what happened in the case of risk-averse consumers. Furthermore, one of the corners
has disappeared: it cannot happen that the firm B supplies to the entire market in equilibrium.
Since the risk does not have to be compensated anymore, the competitive advantage works in
favor of A simply because its expected quality is larger than zero.
The next Proposition states the first-period prices charged by the firms when the consumers
are risk-neutral, and compares the average first-period market price when the consumers are
risk-neutral and when the consumers are risk-averse:
Proposition 12. When the consumers are risk-neutral, it holds that
12.1 The first-period equilibrium prices are
p∗1A =

−2ΠI2A + 2ΠP,rn2A + ΠI2B −ΠP,rn2B + C(3 + µ)
3C if 0 <
C(3 + µ) + Π˜
6C < 1
−1 + µ if 1 < C(3 + µ) + Π˜6C < 1
p∗1B =

−ΠI2A + ΠP,rn2A + 2ΠI2B − 2ΠP,rn2B + C(3− µ)
3C if 0 <
C(3 + µ) + Π˜
6C < 1
0 if 1 <
C(3 + µ) + Π˜
6C < 1
where ΠI2A is defined as in equation (2.18),
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ΠI2B is defined as in equation (2.19),
ΠP,rn2j comes from multiplying the corresponding price times the market share as defined
at the beginning of this section,
and Π˜ = ΠI2A −ΠP,rn2A + ΠI2B −ΠP,rn2B
12.2 The average first-period market price, measured as p1Ax
E
1 + p1B(1 − xE1 ), can be smaller
than when the consumers are risk-averse.
The first part of the Proposition is simply the solution to the intertemporal problem of the firm
when consumers are risk-neutral. About the second part, it is contrary to what happened in
the monopoly case, and it is due to the competition forces. The result takes place because with
risk-aversion, the firm B has an advantage that disappears when consumers are risk-neutral.
Concretely, the advantage can be so large that the firm B optimally charges the same price
in the first period and in the second period when the information cannot be disclosed. This
possibility is ruled out with no risk-aversion.
Consider the next example: µ = 1, σ = 1, C = 11 and ρ = 10. In the equilibrium of the first
period, p1A = 0, p1B = 3 and x
E
1 = 0. Then, the average first-period market price is 3.
Suppose now the same values, but ρ = 0. In the equilibrium of the first period, p1A = 1.33,
p1B = 0.668 and x
E
1 = 0.668. Then, the average first-period price is 1.11 < 3.
2.6 Conclusion and Discussion
I have presented a model of endogenous switching costs derived from the lack of information.
There are two firms who live during two periods: A and B. The product supplied by firm B
is known to be of quality equal to zero, whereas the quality of the product supplied by firm
A is unknown in the first period: it is a continuous random variable normally distributed. All
consumers are assumed to be risk-averse. Those who live in the first period maximize their
instantaneous utility and communicate the information they gathered through direct experience
to the consumers who will live in the second period. Two effects appear due to the lack of
information in the first period: first, the expected quality of the product supplied by A is higher
than the quality of the product supplied by B; second, consumers (who are risk-averse) consider
to test the product offered by A as a risky choice. The decision of the consumers who live in
the first period is affected by their location, the risk-aversion coefficient, the set prices and a
private information component. Then, there are three possible outcomes: all consumers test the
brand A and learn its quality, nobody tests the brand A and its quality remains unknown, and
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the market splits up such that only a positive share of consumers test A and learn its quality.
Notice that the switching costs are endogenous because they depend on the purchasing histories.
In the second period, consumers also maximize their instantaneous utility. Nevertheless, the
private information component is not present anymore, but information across consumers may
differ at the beginning of the period.
If all consumers tested A in the first period, in the second period all the agents are fully informed
because they know the two qualities with certainty. Then, nobody faces a switching cost and
equilibrium prices are not distorted. The prices will be equal if the product supplied by A is of
quality zero, but this event happens with zero probability. A will charge a price higher than B
if its product is of high quality and viceversa.
If all consumers tested B in the first period, the quality of A remains unknown for all the agents
in the second period and cannot be signaled through distorted prices. In this case, all consumers
face a switching cost but the quality effect is also present. Then, the firm B charges an equilib-
rium price higher than its rival if the switching cost effect dominates, that is, if the risk-aversion
coefficient is sufficiently large. The opposite happens if the quality effect dominates, that is, if
the risk-aversion coefficient is low enough. In other words, the model predict that B can be the
dominant firm in the market if consumers are sufficiently risk-averse and the quality of its rival
cannot be signaled.
If the market split up in the first period, consumers are initially divided in two different groups
in the second period: those who know the quality of A and those who do not. Those who know
the quality of A is due to the previous experience of the consumers of the first period, and they
cannot be deceived. Those who do not know the quality of A take the second-period prices as
informative signals. The game is characterized by signaling rivalry between the two firms, and
I have showed that a separating equilibrium may not exist.
Since the two firms are forward-looking, the objective function of the first period is composed
of the addition of the first-period profits and the expected second-period profits. The solution
states that the first-period equilibrium prices are different for the two firms: it is a reasonable
result because the firms are not homogeneous in the first period, as it was explained at the
beginning of the section. Furthermore, the model predicts that B will charge a first-period price
higher than the price of its rival if the risk-aversion coefficient is large enough.
Interesting results are obtained when analyzing the pattern of equilibrium prices. In the stan-
dard models of two periods with switching costs, the prices display a bargain-then-ripoff pattern:
firms compete fiercely in the first period to attract as many consumers as possible and make
them captive; then, they exploit the captive consumers in the second period by setting high
prices. In this model, prices do not display that pattern in all the cases. Actually, when the
information about the quality of A is disclosed in the first period, it may happen that only one
of the firms harvests after having invested in the first period. Concretely, if the quality of A
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is high enough, the firm A charges an equilibrium price in the second period larger than its
equilibrium price in the first period, whereas the rival firm B has to fix a price lower than the
price it set in the first period. The opposite happens when the quality of A is low enough.
Compared to a situation without switching costs, I find that the average price of the first period
may be higher with than without switching costs if the risk-aversion coefficient is sufficiently
large. This contrasts with the classic result of lower first-period prices in the presence of switch-
ing costs, but it is due to the nature of the switching costs considered here. The result happens
because, given the expected quality, the firm that offers the riskless product has a competitive
advantage in the first period when consumers are sufficiently risk averse that does not exist
when consumers are risk neutral. It may happen that its rival cannot compensate completely
this advantage through a price decrease because negative prices are weakly dominated.
These results are due to the nature of the switching costs considered here and to the initial
heterogeneity of the firms. When the information is disclosed, two effects take place. First,
consumers do not face the switching cost anymore: consequently, the firm B loses its advantage
and the firm A does not have to compensate for that cost anymore. Second, the consumers’
willingness to pay for the brand A reacts according to the learned true quality. Furthermore,
the firm B can start taking advantage of the switching cost effect in the first period (instead of
waiting until the second) if the risk-aversion coefficient is sufficiently large. When consumers are
risk-neutral (ρ = 0), the switching cost effect plays no role, but the quality effect still appears.
The different values of the risk-aversion coefficient and the true quality of the product supplied
by A determine which effect dominates and leads to the patterns of prices described before.
To conclude the section, I proceed to discuss the role of some assumptions.
The presence of the random component in the consumers’ utility allows for corner outcomes
in the market shares in the first period: this outcome would determine if consumers face the
switching cost also in the second period and creates an incentive for firms to compete fiercely
in the first period. If I remove this assumption, the solution in the first period will always be
interior and a separating equilibrium may not exist.
Two other assumptions are also crucial. The consideration of a different mass of consumers in
each period means that people learn from the experience of others, that is a fact supported by
evidence. However, this assumption can be removed to consider instead that consumers live
during the entire game and that they are forward-looking. In this case, they would be less
sensitive to low prices in the first period. The assumption of no price discrimination across
consumers who live in the same period can also be removed if we consider that a firm can
identify in the second period to those consumers who acquired its product in the first period.
These extensions are left to future research.
Chapter 3
Do you want to steal my songs?
The importance of diffusion in the
music industry
3.1 Introduction
Nowadays, there is a huge debate on online piracy (i.e. books, movies, TV shows, music...).
Some artists and labels argue that the existence of websites that allow conumers to engage in
piracy leads to a decline of their original profits1. Due to the pressure of the supporters of
stronger intellectual property enforcement, the Parliaments of many countries have approved
different laws oriented to restrict the file sharing, such as SOPA and PIPA in the United States,
HADOPI in France (also known as ”Loi Oliviennes”) and LES in Spain (also known as ”Ley
Sinde-Wert”). The most recent event related to this fight against online piracy is the shutdown
of Megaupload (file-sharing site) by officials2.
Nevertheless, these laws have some loopholes and, as judges have pointed out, there are several
problems regarding the proposed mechanisms that aim to prevent copyright violations. For in-
stance, in United Kingdom, Judge Birss declaired that copyright owners could not accuse people
of illegal filesharing by using their IP addresses, because IP addresses identify an internet con-
nection but not the person who is using the connection at a certain moment in time3. In Spain,
1A report produced by the Institute for Policy Innovation (IPI) in 2007 estimates that music piracy causes
$12.5 billion of economic losses every year in the US (although this amount is not only due to online piracy).
Nevertheless, other authors maintain that this report has several methodological problems, including double
counting.
http://www.ipi.org/docLib/20120515 SoundRecordingPiracy.pdf
http://www.freakonomics.com/2012/01/12/how-much-do-music-and-movie-piracy-really-hurt-the-u-s-economy/
2http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-16642369
3 http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/feb/08/filesharing-prosecutions-digital-
economy?INTCMP=SRCH
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/court-confirms-ip-addresses-arent-people-and-p2p-lawyers-know-it/
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the software developer Pablo Soto was found not guilty in the judgment against Warner, Uni-
versal, EMI, Sony and Promusicae, in which the labels demanded 13 million from Soto in terms
of damages. The Court estimated that ”Soto has developed a technological device that allows
for direct file sharing among consumers, peer to peer, being its technical function completely
neutral”4.
The argument used by the labels is not new in economics: creation of intellectual property
requires a strong initial investment (sunk cost), but the cost of each additional copy of the
product is very small (in software products, it even goes to zero). Then, when the planner has
to maximize the welfare, he faces a trade-off between creation and usage: once the good is in
the market, fixing a price equal to the marginal cost of the copy is efficient because the number
of people who have access to the good is maximized, and the producer covers its variable costs.
Nevertheless, with this policy the creator is not able to recover his initial investment, and he is
better off simply not producing the good which leads to a decrease of welfare for the society.
Therefore, in order to compensate for the sunk cost, the sale prices have to be above the marginal
cost in equilibrium.
On the other hand, we find the defenders of the free culture. Their main arguments are as
follows:
1. The mark-up is excessive: defenders of the free culture sustain that, with lower prices,
many consumers would renounce to download the contents illegally and would acquire
legal copies instead, and creators would still make positive profits (after covering the sunk
cost). Even more so, many cultural activities obtain public subsidies, so consumers who
buy legal copies are actually paying twice, apart from the classical inefficiencies generated
by subsidies and taxes.
2. Free knowledge allows for the creation of new inventions which increase the welfare level
of the society. Boldrin and Levine (2010) explain in the first chapters of their book how
”after the expiration of Watt’s patents, not only was there an explosion in the production
and efficiency of engines, but steam power came into its own as the driving force of the
industrial revolution”5.
3. Simply, it is not feasible to stop the file sharing. So, it would be much better for creators
to stop wasting resources in legal wars trying to keep the monopoly profits that they get
with the current model and try to adapt to the new conditions in order to obtain positive
profits and not to be driven out of the market.
It is possible to find several approaches in the literature showing that the existence of piracy
can be profitable both for artists and for consumers. A more in depth analysis will be provided
in the next section, but it is useful to mention here that these approaches mainly rely on the
4 http://estaticos.elmundo.es/documentos/2011/12/19/sentencia pablo soto.pdf
5 http://levine.sscnet.ucla.edu/papers/imbookfinalall.pdf
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complementarity of the businesses of the artists (tracks and live performances), or on the effect
of sampling when a consumer tries to learn who is his/her favorite artist.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first approach in considering the co-existence of two
heterogeneous platforms. The open platform can be used by the artists to set their tracks to
the consumers for free in a situation with copyright, whereas the for-profit platform charges a
positive price for the tracks. Artists have two revenue sources, concerts and tracks. These two
businesses are related in a very particular way: if the artist is unknown, consumers attend to
his/her concerts only if they have listened his/her tracks before; this externality does not work
for the famous artist, because his/her style is already known. Furthermore, higher attendance
to concerts does not imply a higher sale of tracks. In other words, the externality works only in
one direction6.
With this framework, is very simple to see the trade-off for an artist who is not famous in a
situation with copyright. He/she can either set his/her tracks in the for-profit platform or in the
open platform. If he/she uses the for-profit platform, some consumers would not know about
his/her existence unless the for-profit platform sells the tracks at a low price. If he/she uses the
open platform, all the consumers will know about him/her, but he/she will not earn anything
from the sale of tracks. The negotiation process with copyright is modeled as a Nash bargain-
ing game: first, the for-profit platform proposes a price. If the artist accepts, the two parties
negotiate on the jointly generated surplus until reaching the Nash solution. If the artist rejects,
he/she uses the open platform. If the artist is famous, he/she will always negotiate. If the artist
is unknown, he/she will optimally use the open platform in some parametric regions.
When we introduce piracy, all the tracks would be available in the open platform independently
of the desires of the artists. The immediate consequences are a decrease in the prices of the
tracks and the achievement of the maximal degree of diffusion for all the artists. I consider two
definitions for the jointly generated surplus with piracy. If the jointly generated surplus includes
the same elements as in the situation without piracy (of course taking into account the decrease
in prices), the total welfare does not decrease when moving from a situation with copyright. If
the jointly generated surplus only includes the sale of tracks, total welfare can actually decrease
with piracy.
With respect to the surpluses of the agents, piracy always implies a redistribution of welfare. I
find that the for-profit platform and the famous artists are always damaged, whereas consumers
and unknown artists may be better off.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to a review of the literature.
Section 3 explains the main features of the model, Section 4 provides the solution with copyrights
and Section 5 explains the differences between the two specifications of the piracy. Section 6
analyzes how the equilibrium prices and individual surpluses change with the introduction of
piracy. Section 7 studies the changes in total welfare. Section 8 examines the special case in
which the quality of the tracks available in the two platforms is almost the same and Section 9
concludes.
6If the activities were complementary, more attendance to concerts would imply higher sales of tracks.
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3.2 Related literature
Borrowing the definition from Belleflamme and Peitz (2010a)7, I define piracy as the ”unautho-
rized reproduction, use, or diffusion of a copyrighted work”. Concretely, I present a model of
end-consumer piracy. Contrary to the commercial (or for-profit) piracy, the open platform does
not make any profits in my framework: it is simply a platform in which the consumers share
their files; even more, this action cannot be legally punished8.
Nevertheless, ”unauthorized” does not mean ”unprofitable”, and several models have pointed
out the positive effects of piracy in the final profits obtained by the artists and/or the music
industry.
Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006b) present a model with consumer sampling. The authors consider
a multi-product monopolist who offers N products equidistantly located in the Salop circle and
consumers with a total mass of 1, that have an ideal variety and who buy at most one product.
The consumers make two choices: downloading (yes/no) and buying (yes/no). If consumers
download, they learn the exact location of the product that provides the best fit to their prefer-
ences; if they do not, they can only buy randomly. When downloading is allowed, there will be
some consumers who would not buy the version for sale anymore (causing a decrease in the prof-
its of the monopolist), but the consumers who buy after downloading have a higher willingness
to pay because they buy exactly their ideal variety (then, the monopolist can charge a higher
price and increase its profits). The authors show that the possibility of downloading yields
higher profits if there is enough taste heterogeneity and enough product diversity. Although
in my model piracy may be profitable too, our approaches have two main differences: first, I
consider the artists and the platforms as different agents with different incentives and that is
the reason behind the result that piracy may be profitable for the artists, but that it will always
be damaging for the for-profit platform; and second, I consider two different artists instead of a
multi-product monopolist and I allow the consumers to acquire the tracks and concerts of both
artists that is why I can describe a demand-creation effect. Nevertheless, the sampling effect has
a similar flavor to the externalities that I describe: in Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006b), consumers
learn about their ideal variety after downloading; in my model, consumers learn about the ex-
istence of certain varieties they may want to consume after downloading.
Minniti and Vergari (2010) analyze how the presence of a private, small-scale file-sharing com-
munity affects the pricing behavior and profitability of producers of digital goods. The authors
assume two producers a` la Hotelling and three possible types of consumers: consumers who buy
one good, consumers who buy one good and download the other, and consumers who do not use
any of the goods. The file-sharing community considered has a very particular feature: to gain
access, the consumers have to buy and share a digital good with other members (that is why
7This is an excellent survey that the reader can check to get a general picture of the current literature about
end-consumer piracy.
8The reader can think for instance of u-Torrent.
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we cannot observe consumers who only download). By comparing fully covered and partially
covered markets, the model states that firms benefit from piracy in emerging markets since it
allows to reach a higher share of customers who otherwise will not use any of the two goods.
Nevertheless, this effect of demand creation is absent in mature markets and piracy is therefore
detrimental for firms in this context. I find a similar conclusion in my model: piracy is always
harmful for famous artists (or ”mature”) because it does not yield the demand-creation effect,
whereas it does for unknown artists (or ”emerging”). But in my framework, the file-sharing
community is represented by an open platform: consumers do not need to buy anything in ad-
vance to use it. Instead, I consider the existence of externalities between the profits derived by
two different activities: sold tracks and concerts. An additional difference is that Minniti and
Vergari (2010) do not include the figure of the intermediaries, whereas I differentiate between
the incentives of the artists (”producers”) and the for-profit platform.
A relevant paper is one by Gayer and Shy (2006). Similar to my findings, the authors also
point out the conflict of interests between the artists and their ”publishers” (for-profit platform
in my case): the two parties share the profits derived from selling the copyrighted tracks, but
the artists also earn profits from other market activities, like the concerts, that are not always
shared with the publishers. Gayer and Shy (2006) assume that the consumers benefit from
network externalities both in recordings and in live performances, and that these two goods
are complements. Because of these network externalities in the two markets, the authors find
that piracy can be profitable at the same time for publishers and for artists, although this is
not necessarily the case (depending on the parameters, it may be that the piracy is harmful
for the artist and the publisher, or profitable for the artist whereas harmful for the publisher).
Since my externality only works in one direction, in my model the existence of piracy is always
detrimental for the for-profit platform, although it may be profitable for the artist under certain
conditions. In addition, I endogenize the share in profits for the agents by entering a Nash bar-
gaining process, instead of assuming it as given and independent of the existence of piracy. As
expected, the share of profits derived from the bargaining process differs with and without piracy.
All the previously discussed papers follow a theoretical approach. The interested reader can
consult Waldfogel (2012a) for a quantitative study about the quality of the new recorded mu-
sic since Napster. The paper concludes that there is no evidence of a reduction in the quality
of music released since Napster, and actually the study suggests an increase in quality since 1999.
3.3 The model
Consider the music industry. There are three groups of agents: artists (producers of music),
consumers (consumers of music) and platforms (intermediaries).
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There are two different platforms: one of them is an open platform and the other is a for-profit
platform. The open platform supplies music to the consumers without charging any price or
membership and, consequently, makes zero profits. A real example of this kind of platform is
u-Torrent. The existence of intermediaries who earn no profits has been justified in the liter-
ature because of individual preferences, long-run cooperation, and networking. The for-profit
platform supplies music at a positive price to all consumers who are willing to pay for it, and
it does not discriminate in prices. A real example of this kind of platform is i-Tunes. Notice
that the for-profit platform does not create any music; therefore, it has to sign a contract with
at least one artist to have some tracks to supply. The optimal terms of these contracts will be
specified later.
There are two artists. Each one can be famous or unknown, and production costs are normalized
to zero for the two types9. The industry can be configured by two famous artists, one famous and
one unknown, or two unknown artists. Each artist has two revenue sources: his corresponding
share when his tracks are sold in the for-profit platform, and the attendance to his concerts. The
artists are single-homing without piracy, that is, the artist who accepts the contract offered by
the for-profit platform knows that his tracks will be supplied only by that platform in the same
vein, he can use the open platform if he finds the offered contract inconvenient. With piracy,
tracks will be available at the open platform even if the artists accept the contract offered by
the for-profit platform.
Finally, there are two consumers. They are homogeneous in their valuation of concerts, w, but
heterogeneous in their valuation of tracks: these assumptions are made to focus on the role of
the diffusion in the music industry. consumers are multi-homing with and without piracy, that
is, they can acquire the tracks wherever available.
I make the next assumption about consumers’ valuation of tracks:
Assumption 6. Each consumer values the tracks of the two artists equally, but these valuations
differ across consumers. Denoting artists by a and b and consumers by i and j, without loss of
generality:
via = v
i
b = v > 0
vja = v
j
b = Ωv, with Ω ∈ (0, 1)
The, we can define utilities as follows:
9This assumption will be discussed in the Conclusions.
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Definition 1. The utility of consumer i of purchasing a track in the for-profit platform is
uiP = v − p (3.1)
and the utility when she uses the open platform instead is
uiO = αv (3.2)
with α ∈ (0, 1). In the same way, the utility of consumer j of purchasing a track in the for-profit
platform is
ujP = Ωv − p (3.3)
and the utility when she uses the open platform instead is
ujO = αΩv (3.4)
If the track is not available in the open platform and the consumer does not acquire it in the
for-profit platform, her utility is normalized to zero
uiNC = u
j
NC = 0 (3.5)
Notice that the price is not an element of the utility derived from using the open platform,
because tracks are supplied for free. Nevertheless, the fact that α belongs to the interval (0, 1)
captures the idea that the two platforms are not perfect substitutes in terms of gross utility.
This parameter α can be justified by thinking that the qualities of the tracks are different in
the two platforms, or that consumers waste some time surfing the internet until they find the
correct file that they want to download.
This a standard way to model piracy in the literature. Nevertheless, other alternatives can be
used as long as there exists a positive price such that consumers prefer to use the open platform
for prices above that threshold instead of using the for-profit platform.
The previous assumption is made to have a finite set of prices that the for-profit platform can
use in the contracts. When the for-profit platform has to select a high price or a low price when
offering the contract to the artist, we can see intuitively the conflict of interests between the
players: both consumers acquire the tracks in the for-profit platform with the low price, whereas
only one of the two consumers acquires the tracks in the for-profit platform with the high price.
The attendance to concerts is directly related to the number of people who know the artist.
Therefore, an unknown artist prefers the platform to charge a low price when there is no piracy,
but the profits of the platform can be maximized by charging a high price. The trade-off also
exists with a continuum of consumers and prices, but is easier to understand with a discrete
number of prices.
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Now, I proceed to explain how the two businesses of the artists, concerts and tracks, are related.
As it was mentioned above, I assume that all consumers have the same willingness to pay for a
concert, w > v, and that this is in fact the price of a ticket. By doing so, I reduce the number
of choices that the artist has to make: with this framework, his single decision is to accept or
reject the contract offered by the for-profit platform. If I would add the decision of the optimal
ticket price, the problem would be more complex and it would only serve as a distraction from
the role of the diffusion.
It is reasonable to think that the probability of attendance to the concert of a famous artist
does not depend on the consumers having listened his most recent tracks. The artist’ style is
already known by everyone, and someone who likes it would attend to the concert in any case
(and she would not attend if she dislikes). Therefore, the number of sold tracks is not related
to the revenues by concerts if the artist is famous, that is, diffusion means nothing to him.
On the contrary, diffusion is crucial for an unknown artist: if a consumer does not know about
the existence of an artist, the probability of attending to a concert is zero. Nevertheless, the
consumer will attend to the concert if she listen his tracks and likes them (and will not attend if
she dislikes the tracks). Because of this, unknown artists have incentives to care about diffusion.
The previous reasoning is formalized in this assumption:
Assumption 7. Let us denote the probability of attendance to a concert by q if the consumer
has listened the tracks and by q˜ if she did not. Then:
If the artist c = {a, b} is famous, the probability that the consumer k = {i, j} attends to his
concert does not depend on having listened his last tracks:
1 ≥ qkFc = q˜kFc ≥ 0
If the artist k = {i, j} is unknown, the probability that the consumer c = {a, b} attends to
his concert is zero if she does not listen before his tracks. The probability of attendance after
listening his tracks may be positive:
1 ≥ qkUc ≥ q˜kUc = 0
Furthermore, all the probabilities are common knowledge.
The previous assumption can be interpreted in terms of externalities. higher diffusion implies
(weakly) higher revenues from concerts, but the effect does not work in the other direction, that
is, higher attendance to a concert does not imply a higher number of sold tracks. The reason is
that I consider that nobody is willing to pay the price of a ticket w without having confirmed
if she likes the style of the artist. This claim is justified if we agree that the price of a ticket is
much higher than the price of a track. Then, the acquisition of a track happens before attending
to the concert, and not the other way around. Therefore, I say that the externality only goes in
one direction from tracks to concerts.
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3.4 The situation with copyright
In a situation with copyright, the artist is sure that his tracks will be supplied only by the
platform he wants. If the artist signs a contract to put his tracks in the for-profit platform,
two possible prices can be charged to consumers: a high price pH that comes from equalizing
equations (3.1) and (3.5), and a low price pL that comes from equalizing equations (3.3) and
(3.5). Concretely,
pH = v (3.6)
and
pL = vΩ. (3.7)
Notice that, since copyright is not violated and the for-profit platform does not discriminate in
prices, the high price extracts all the surplus of the consumer with the largest willingness to
pay10; and the low price extracts all the surplus of the consumer with the lowest willingness to
pay and leaves positive rents for the other consumer.
In the contracting process, the for-profit platform sets the price and the artist says ”yes” or
”no”. If the answer is ”yes”, then the two parties (artist and for-profit platform) negotiate. The
generated surplus is shared according to the Nash bargaining solution.
Observe that the surplus generated by the agreement differs depending on the artist type. If the
artist is famous, the generated surplus is the number of sold tracks times the price: revenues from
concerts cannot be included, since the consumers already know him. If the artist is unknown, the
generated surplus is the number of sold tracks times the price plus the revenues from concerts: in
this case, the for-profit platform has a relevant role in the number of consumers who learn about
the existence of the unknown artist, and it is key for the size of his revenues from concerts. Of
course, we need the revenue from concerts to be verifiable (otherwise, they cannot be included
in the Nash function).
If agreement between the two parties does not happen, the for-profit platform earns zero, whereas
the artist c earns w(qic + q
j
c) because he can use the open platform to set his tracks11.
Let me denote by r the share of the generated surplus belonging to the artist. In maths, the
Nash bargaining program when the artist is famous and the platform sets the high price is
maximize
rH
[(1− rH)v − 0][(rH)v − (wqiF + wqjF )]
The equilibrium share is
r∗H;F =
v + wqiF + wq
j
F
2v
(3.8)
10The consumer with the lowest willingness to pay does not buy the track at this price.
11Remember that tracks are sold at zero price at the open platform. Then, the artist gets the maximal degree
of diffusion.
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In the same way, if the platform sets the low price:
maximize
rL
[(1− rL)2vΩ− 0][(rL)2vΩ− (wqiF + wqjF )]
The equilibrium share is
r∗L;F =
2vΩ + wqiF + wq
j
F
4vΩ
(3.9)
Notice that the two equilibrium shares are strictly positive. Further, they can be higher than one
as well: in this case, we will be in a corner solution and the artist would receive all the generated
surplus. Of course, a famous artist will always choose the for-profit platform to set his tracks
since he always get a positive proportion of a surplus that is not generated if he chooses the
open platform.
Proceeding analogously for the unknown artist, the Nash bargaining program when the for-profit
platform sets the high price is
maximize
rH
[(1− rH)(v + wqiU )− 0][(rH)(v + wqiU )− (wqiU + wqjU ]
The equilibrium share is
r∗H;U =
v + 2wqiF + wq
j
F
2v + 2wqiF
(3.10)
In the same way, if the platform sets the low price:
maximize
rL
[(1− rL)(2vΩ + wqiU + wqjU )− 0][(rL)(2vΩ + wqiU + wqjU )− (wqiU + wqjU )]
The equilibrium share is
r∗L;U =
vΩ + wqiU + wq
j
U
2vΩ + wqiU + wq
j
U
(3.11)
Observe that the two equilibrium shares are strictly positive. Furthermore, the equilibrium share
when the for-profit platform sets the low price is strictly less than one. In this case, the unknown
artist accepts the contract because it is always more profitable than choosing the open platform.
The situation is slightly more complicated if the for-profit platform sets the high price: if r∗H;U ≥
1, the artist gets all the generated profit, that is the price of one track and the revenue from
concerts when one consumer attends. Nevertheless, whenever r∗H;U ≥ 1 it holds that the artist is
actually better off by putting his tracks in the open platform and obtaining the maximal degree
of diffusion with associated profits wqiU + wq
j
U . Concretely, r
∗
H;U ≥ 1 if and only if qjU ≥ v/w.
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Then, the unknown artist says ”no” to the negotiation in this case. On the contrary, if qjU < v/w,
the unknown artist optimally says ”yes” to the negotiation with the for-profit platform.
To conclude the section, let me remark that the equilibrium shares from the Nash bargaining
have an intuitive interpretation. Each part receives half of the excess generated surplus (surplus
generated by the agreement minus the sum of the two outside options) plus its outside option,
everything normalized by the size of the generated surplus. For instance, the equilibrium share
when the artist is famous and the for-profit platform sets the high price for the tracks is
r∗H;F =
1
v
(
v − wqiF − wqjF
2
+ wqiF + wq
j
F
)
=
v + wqiF + wq
j
F
2v
3.5 The situation with piracy: two specifications
In a situation with piracy, the artist knows that his tracks will be supplied by the open platform
even if he accepts the contract offered by the for-profit platform. With piracy, a dominant
strategy for any artist is to sign the contract offered by the for-profit platform: he is going to
obtain the maximal degree of diffusion anyways, and accepting the agreement with the for-profit
platform provides an extra profit derived from the sale of tracks.
When the artist is unknown, we can model piracy in two different ways. In the first way, the
revenues from concerts are still included in the Nash bargaining program: despite maximal degree
of diffusion is guaranteed, some consumers know about the existence of the artist thanks to the
for-profit platform. In the second way, the revenues derived from concerts are not included in
the Nash bargaining program: the generation of these revenues do not depend on the agreement
between the artist and the for-profit platform, because the tracks are supplied by the open
platform as well.
Again, two prices can be charged for acquiring the tracks in the for-profit platform: high and
low. But, when copyright is violated, these prices do not extract all the surplus of the marginal
consumer. Concretely, the high price pˆH comes from equalizing the equations (3.1) and (3.2);
and the low price pˆL comes from equalizing the equations (3.3) and (3.4):
pˆH = v(1− α) (3.12)
and
pˆL = vΩ(1− α). (3.13)
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Of course, the previous distinction makes no sense if the artist is famous: revenues from concerts
are never part of the Nash bargaining program. Then, the Nash bargaining program if the for-
profit platform sets the high price pˆH is:
maximize
rH
[(1− rH)(v(1− α))− 0][(rH)(v(1− α))− (wqiF + wqjF )]
The equilibrium share is
rˆH;F =
v(1− α) + wqiF + wqjF
2v(1− α) (3.14)
Similarly, the Nash bargaining program if the for-profit platform sets the low price pˆL is
maximize
rL
[(1− rL)(2vΩ(1− α))− 0][(rL)(2vΩ(1− α))− (wqiF + wqjF )]
The equilibrium share is
rˆL;F =
2vΩ(1− α) + wqiF + wqjF
4vΩ(1− α) (3.15)
Notice that r∗H;F < rˆH;F and that r
∗
L;F < rˆL;F : the surplus generated by the agreement is lower
with piracy because of the decrease in the prices, but the outside options do not change. Then,
the famous artist is relatively ”stronger” and his equilibrium share is higher.
3.5.1 Specification 1
As it was commented previously, the revenues from concerts are included in the Nash bargaining
program in this specification. Then, when the artist is unknown and the for-profit platform sets
the high price pˆH :
maximize
rH
[(1− rH)(v(1− α) + wqiU )− 0][(rH)(v(1− α) + wqiU )− (wqiU + wqjU ]
The equilibrium share is
rˆ∗H;U =
v(1− α) + 2wqiF + wqjF
2v(1− α) + 2wqiF
(3.16)
Analogously, when the artist is unknown and the for-profit platform sets the low price pˆL:
maximize
rL
[(1− rL)(2vΩ(1− α) + wqiU + wqjU )− 0][(rL)(2vΩ(1− α) + wqiU + wqjU )− (wqiU + wqjU )]
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The equilibrium share is
rˆ∗L;U =
vΩ(1− α) + wqiU + wqjU
2vΩ(1− α) + wqiU + wqjU
(3.17)
It is worth observing that r∗H;U < rˆ
∗
H;U and that r
∗
L;U < rˆ
∗
L;U . The same logic as before applies:
since the outside options do not change and the total generated surplus is lower with piracy due to
the price decrease, the unknown artist is relatively ”stronger” and his equilibrium share is higher.
3.5.2 Specification 2
We proceed in the same way, but keeping in mind that the revenues from concerts are not
included in the Nash bargaining programs.
when the artist is unknown and the for-profit platform sets the high price pˆH :
maximize
rH
[(1− rH)(v(1− α))− 0][(rH)(v(1− α))− (wqiU + wqjU ]
The equilibrium share is
rˆ∗∗H;U =
v(1− α) + wqiF + wqjF
2v(1− α) (3.18)
Analogously, when the artist is unknown and the for-profit platform sets the low price pˆL:
maximize
rL
[(1− rL)(2vΩ(1− α))− 0][(rL)(2vΩ(1− α))− (wqiU + wqjU )]
The equilibrium share is
rˆ∗∗L;U =
2vΩ(1− α) + wqiU + wqjU
4vΩ(1− α) + wqiU + wqjU
(3.19)
Again, it holds that r∗H;U < rˆ
∗∗
H;U and that r
∗
L;U < rˆ
∗∗
L;U because the surplus generated by the
agreement is lower with piracy and the outside options do not change.
Furthermore, the same idea works across the two specifications: rˆ∗H;U < rˆ
∗∗
H;U and rˆ
∗
L;U < rˆ
∗∗
L;U
because the surplus generated by the agreement is higher in the first specification and the outside
options do not change; thus, the unknown artist is relatively ”stronger” in the second specifica-
tion and it is reflected in a higher equilibrium share.
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3.6 Configurations of the music industry
In this section, I calculate the players’ surpluses and state some results about who wins and who
loses if we move from a situation with copyright to a situation with piracy.
3.6.1 Two famous artists
Without loss of generality, I denote by Fa to the famous artist a and by Fb to the famous artist
b.
In a situation with copyright, the surpluses of the agents when the for-profit platform sets pH
are
CS∗H;FaFb = 0
pi∗H;FaFb = (1− r∗H;Fa)v + (1− r∗H;Fb)v
pi∗H;Fa = r
∗
H;Fav + wq
i
Fa + wq
j
Fa
pi∗H;Fb = r
∗
H;Fbv + wq
i
F b + wq
j
Fb
(3.20)
The corresponding surpluses when the for-profit platform sets pL are
CS∗L;FaFb = 2v(1− Ω)
pi∗L;FaFb = (1− r∗L;Fa)2vΩ + (1− r∗L;Fb)2vΩ
pi∗L;Fa = r
∗
L;Fa2vΩ + wq
i
Fa + wq
j
Fa
pi∗L;Fb = r
∗
L;Fb2vΩ + wq
i
F b + wq
j
Fb
(3.21)
In a situation with piracy, the surpluses of the agents when the for-profit platform sets pˆH are
CˆSH;FaFb = 2vα(1 + Ω)
pˆiH;FaFb = (1− rˆH;Fa)v(1− α) + (1− rˆH;Fb)v(1− α)
pˆiH;Fa = rˆH;Fav(1− α) + wqiFa + wqjFa
pˆiH;Fb = rˆH;Fbv(1− α) + wqiF b + wqjFb
(3.22)
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The corresponding surpluses when the for-profit platform sets pˆL are
CˆSL;FaFb = 2v(1− Ω) + 4vΩα
pˆiL;FaFb = (1− rˆL;Fa)2vΩ(1− α) + (1− rˆL;Fb)2vΩ(1− α)
pˆiL;Fa = rˆL;Fa2vΩ(1− α) + wqiFa + wqjFa
pˆiL;Fb = rˆL;Fb2vΩ(1− α) + wqiF b + wqjFb
(3.23)
The next proposition states who wins and who loses if we move from copyright to piracy:
Proposition 13. If the industry is configured by two famous artists and we move from a
situation with copyright to a situation with piracy, the consumers are better off whereas the
for-profit platform and the two artists are worse off.
The intuition of the result is as follows: since the criteria to set a high or a low price is the same
with and without piracy, the only effect of the piracy is to decrease the prices and therefore the
size of the surplus generated by the agreement. Then, the consumers’ utility increases whereas
the sellers’ profits decrease.
3.6.2 A famous artist and an unknown artist
Without loss of generality, I consider that the artist a is famous and that the artist b is unknown.
In a situation with copyright, the famous artist always signs the contract independently of the
set price. The unknown artist always signs if the set price is low, but only accepts the contract
with the high price if qjU < v/w.
I will denote by the subindex U that the unknown artist negotiates with the for-profit platform,
and by the subindex U¯ that he does not negotiate.
Then, the total surpluses of the agents when the for-profit platform sets pH and q
j
U < v/w are:
CS∗H;FU = 0
pi∗H;FU = (1− r∗H;F )v + (1− r∗H;U )(v + wqiU )
pi∗H;F = r
∗
H;F v + wq
i
F + wq
j
F
pi∗H;U = r
∗
H;U (v + wq
i
U )
(3.24)
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The total surpluses of the agents when the for-profit platform sets pH and q
j
U ≥ v/w are:
CS∗H;FU¯ = vα(1 + Ω)
pi∗H;FU¯ = (1− r∗H;F )v
pi∗H;F = r
∗
H;F v + wq
i
F + wq
j
F
pi∗H;U¯ = wq
i
U + wq
j
U
(3.25)
And the total surpluses of the agents when the for-profit platform sets pL are
CS∗L;FU = 2v(1− Ω)
pi∗L;FU = (1− r∗L;F )2vΩ + (1− r∗L;U )(2vΩ + wqiU + wqjU )
pi∗L;F = r
∗
L;F 2vΩ + wq
i
F + wq
j
F
pi∗L;U = r
∗
L;U (2vΩ + wq
i
U + wq
j
U )
(3.26)
With piracy, both the famous artist and the unknown artist accept the contract offered by the
for-profit platform independently of the price.
Consider the specification 1. The total surpluses of the agents when the for-profit platform sets
pˆH are
CˆS
∗
H;FU = 2vα(1 + Ω)
pˆi∗H;FU = (1− rˆH;F )(v(1− α)) + (1− rˆ∗H;U )(v(1− α) + wqiU )
pˆi∗H;F = rˆH;F v(1− α) + wqiF + wqjF
pˆi∗H;U = rˆ
∗
H;U (v(1− α) + wqiU ) + wqjU
(3.27)
The corresponding surpluses when the for-profit platform sets pˆL are
CˆS
∗
L;FU = 2v(1− Ω) + 4vΩα
pˆi∗L;FU = (1− rˆL;F )2vΩ(1− α) + (1− rˆ∗L;U )(2vΩ(1− α) + wqiU + wqjU )
pˆi∗L;F = rˆL;F 2vΩ(1− α) + wqiF + wqjF
pˆi∗L;U = rˆ
∗
L;U (2vΩ(1− α) + wqiU + wqjU )
(3.28)
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Consider the specification 2. The total surpluses of the agents when the for-profit platform sets
pˆH are
CˆS
∗∗
H;FU = 2vα(1 + Ω)
pˆi∗∗H;FU = (1− rˆH;F )(v(1− α)) + (1− rˆ∗∗H;U )(v(1− α))
pˆi∗∗H;F = rˆH;F v(1− α) + wqiF + wqjF
pˆi∗∗H;U = rˆ
∗∗
H;Uv(1− α) + wqiU + wqjU
(3.29)
And the total surpluses of the agents when the for-profit platform sets pˆL are
CˆS
∗∗
L;FU = 2v(1− Ω) + 4vΩα
pˆi∗∗L;FU = (1− rˆL;F )2vΩ(1− α) + (1− rˆ∗∗L;U )(2vΩ(1− α))
pˆi∗∗L;F = rˆL;F 2vΩ(1− α) + wqiF + wqjF
pˆi∗∗L;U = rˆ
∗∗
L;U2vΩ(1− α) + wqiU + wqjU
(3.30)
The next proposition states who wins and who loses when moving from a situation with copyright
to a situation with piracy.
Proposition 14. Consider an industry configured by a famous artist and an unknown artist.
If piracy is defined according to specification 1,
· Only consumers are better off with piracy if Ω ≥ 1/2
· If Ω < 1/2 and the for-profit platform sets pH with copyright, when we enter piracy
consumers are better off, the for-profit platform and the famous artist are worse off, and
the unknown artist may be better off.
· If Ω < 1/2 and the for-profit platform sets pL with copyright, when we enter piracy only
consumers are better off.
If piracy is defined according to specification 2,
· If Ω ≥ 1/2, when we enter piracy consumers are better off, the for-profit platform and the
famous artist are worse off, and the unknown artist may be better off.
· If Ω < 1/2 and the for-profit platform sets pH with copyright, when we enter piracy
consumers are better off, the for-profit platform and the famous artist are worse off, and
the unknown artist may be better off.
· If Ω < 1/2 and the for-profit platform sets pL with copyright, when we enter piracy it is
possible to find examples in which only the unknown artist is better off.
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Although the formal proof is quite complicated, let me provide the main intuition of the results.
It is pretty obvious that the for-profit platform and the famous artist are worse off when piracy
is allowed12. Since the surpluses derived from agreements are lower and the equilibrium shares
for the artists are higher, the profits of the for-profit platform always decrease. The higher
equilibrium share corresponding to the famous artist is not enough to compensate the smaller
size of the surplus generated by the agreement13.
The intuitions for to the consumers and the unknown artist are not so evident.
It can be proved that, with specification 1, if price pH (pL) is set with copyright, price pˆH (pˆL)
will be set with piracy. Nevertheless, with specification 2 it can happen that the for-profit plat-
form sets price pL with copyright and price pˆH with piracy. The logic behind this is that with
specification 1, the surpluses included in the Nash programs have the same elements with and
without piracy: the sale of tracks for the famous artist, and the sale of tracks and the corre-
sponding concerts for the unknown artist. Nevertheless, this is not true for the specification 2.
If Ω ≥ 1/2, the for-profit platform sets the low price with and without piracy, and the two
artists sign the contract. Both consumers acquire the two songs with and without piracy, but
with piracy they pay a lower price and their utility increases. If we consider the specification 1
for the piracy, the unknown artist shares all the surplus with the for-profit platform: the higher
equilibrium share corresponding to the artist is not enough to compensate the smaller size of the
generated surplus. Nevertheless, with the specification 2, the artist does not share the revenues
derived from concerts: depending on the attendance probabilities of the consumers, it may be
better off or worse off.
If Ω < 1/2 and the for-profit platform sets pL without piracy, only consumers are better off. The
reason is the same explained in the previous paragraph. Nevertheless if the for-profit platform
sets pH , in addition to consumers, the unknown artist may be better off: the reason is that, with
piracy, consumer j learns about his existence in the open platform and can go to his concert,
contrary to the case without piracy. To be better off, this positive earning has to compensate
the decrease in the profits due to the smaller size of the generated surplus.
To illustrate the last point, let me consider a numerical example. Parameter values are as fol-
lows: v = 1/2, w = 1, α = 1/4, Ω = 3/8, qia = 1/64, q
j
a = 1/4, qib = 1/128 and q
i
b = 17/64.
The subindex a refers to the famous artist and the subindex b refers to the unknown artist. The
equilibrium shares without piracy are r∗H,a = 49/64 and r
∗
H,b = 10/13 when the platform sets the
high price pH , and r
∗
L,a = 41/48 and r
∗
L,b = 59/83 when it sets the low price pL. Then, profits
of the platform are 15/64 if the high price is charged and 31/128 if the low price is charged
instead. Since 31/128¿15/64, the platform sets the low price in equilibrium without piracy. The
consumer surplus is 5/8 and the profit of the unknown artist is 59/128.
Since Ω < 1/2, the for-profit platform sets the high price pˆH with piracy (specification 2). The
profit of the for-profit platform is 27/256, the consumer surplus is 11/32 and the profit of the
unknown artist is 153/256.
Notice that the for-profit platform sets the price to maximize its profits in each situation (with
12The famous artist is never better off with piracy, but for some parameter values his profits keep unchanged.
13Remember that the earnings derived from concerts are never included in the Nash bargaining program, so
they are not crucial when comparing the profits of the famous artist with and without piracy.
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or without piracy), and it does not take into account the welfare of the other agents. It is clear
that the unknown artist is worse off because, without piracy, he had to share all the generated
surplus with the for-profit platform, whereas with piracy he only shares the revenues from the
sale of tracks. The decrease in the consumer surplus may look more surprising, but actually it is
not: with the low price with copyright, the consumer with the highest willingness to pay enjoys
positive rents and the other consumer do not buy any song. With piracy and the high price, both
of them have a utility equal to the utility derived from listening the tracks in the open platform.
Of course, the utility of consumer j is higher with piracy, but the utility of consumer i is lower
and this negative effect dominates the overall when comparing with the situation without piracy.
Figure 3.1: Equilibrium with copyright
Figure 3.2: Equilibrium with piracy
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3.6.3 Two unknown artists
With copyright, the unknown artist c negotiates with the for-profit platform when it sets the
high price pH if q
j
c < v/w, and always negotiates when the for-profit platform sets the low price
pL.
I will denote by the subindex Uc that the unknown artist c accepts the contract offered by the
for-profit platform, and by the subindex U¯c that he does not negotiate.
The total surpluses of the agents when the for-profit platform sets pH if q
j
Ua < v/w and q
j
Ub < v/w
are
CS∗H;UaUb = 0
pi∗H;UaUb = (1− r∗H;Ua)(v + wqiUa) + (1− r∗H;Ub)(v + wqiUb)
pi∗H;Ua = r
∗
H;Ua(v + wq
i
Ua)
pi∗H;Ub = r
∗
H;Ub(v + wq
i
Ub)
(3.31)
The surpluses when the for-profit platform sets pH if q
j
Ua < v/w and q
j
Ub > v/w are
CS∗H;UaU¯b = αv(1 + Ω)
pi∗H;UaU¯b = (1− r∗H;Ua)(v + wqiUa)
pi∗H;Ua = r
∗
H;Ua(v + wq
i
Ua)
pi∗H;U¯b = w(q
i
Ub + q
j
Ub)
(3.32)
The surpluses when the for-profit platform sets pH if q
j
Ua > v/w and q
j
Ub < v/w are
CS∗H;U¯aUb = αv(1 + Ω)
pi∗H;U¯aUb = (1− r∗H;Ub)(v + wqiUb)
pi∗H;U¯a = w(q
i
Ua + q
j
Ua)
pi∗H;Ub = r
∗
H;Ub(v + wq
i
Ub)
(3.33)
Notice that, if qjUa > v/w and q
j
Ub > v/w, the firm optimally sets pL (otherwise, it makes zero
profits).
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The surpluses when the for-profit sets pL are
CS∗L;UaUb = 2v(1− Ω)
pi∗L;UaUb = (1− r∗L;Ua)(2vΩ + wqiUa + wqjUa) + (1− r∗L;Ub)(2vΩ + wqiUb + wqjUb)
pi∗L;Ua = r
∗
L;Ua(2vΩ + wq
i
Ua + wq
j
Ua)
pi∗L;Ub = r
∗
L;Ub(2vΩ + wq
i
Ub + wq
j
Ub)
(3.34)
With piracy, both artists accept the contract offered by the for-profit platform independently of
the price.
Consider the specification 1. The total surpluses of the agents when the for-profit platform sets
pˆH are
CˆS
∗
H;UaUb = 2vα(1 + Ω)
pˆi∗H;UaUb = (1− rˆ∗H;Ua)(v(1− α) + wqiUa) + (1− rˆ∗H;Ub)(v(1− α) + wqiUb)
pˆi∗H;Ua = rˆ
∗
H;Ua(v(1− α) + wqiUa) + wqjUa
pˆi∗H;Ub = rˆ
∗
H;Ub(v(1− α) + wqiUb) + wqjUb
(3.35)
The corresponding surpluses when the for-profit platform sets pˆL are
CˆS
∗
L;UaUb = 2v(1− Ω) + 4vΩα
pˆi∗L;UaUb = (1− rˆ∗L;Ua)(2vΩ(1− α) + wqiUa + wqjUa) + (1− rˆ∗L;Ub)(2vΩ(1− α) + wqiUb + wqjUb)
pˆi∗L;Ua = rˆ
∗
L;Ua(2vΩ(1− α) + wqiUa + wqjUa)
pˆi∗L;Ub = rˆ
∗
L;Ub(2vΩ(1− α) + wqiUb + wqjUb)
(3.36)
Consider the specification 2. The surpluses of the agents when the for-profit platform sets pˆH
are
CˆS
∗∗
H;UaUb = 2vα(1 + Ω)
pˆi∗∗H;UaUb = (1− rˆ∗∗H;Ua)(v(1− α)) + (1− rˆ∗∗H;Ub)(v(1− α))
pˆi∗∗H;Ua = rˆ
∗∗
H;Ua(v(1− α)) + wqiUa + wqjUa
pˆi∗∗H;Ub = rˆ
∗∗
H;Ub(v(1− α)) + wqiUb + wqjUb
(3.37)
The next proposition states who wins and who loses when moving from a situation with copyright
to a situation with piracy.
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Proposition 15. Consider an industry configured by two unknown artists.
If piracy is defined according to specification 1,
· Only consumers are better off with piracy if Ω ≥ 1/2
· If Ω < 1/2 and the for-profit platform sets pH with copyright, when we enter piracy
consumers are better off, the for-profit platform is worse off, and the artists may be better
off.
· If Ω < 1/2 and the for-profit platform sets pL with copyright, when we enter piracy only
consumers are better off.
If piracy is defined according to specification 2,
· If Ω ≥ 1/2, when we enter piracy consumers are better off, the for-profit platform is worse
off, and the artists may be better off.
· If Ω < 1/2 and the for-profit platform sets pH with copyright, when we enter piracy
consumers are better off, the for-profit platform is worse off, and the artists may be better
off.
· If Ω < 1/2 and the for-profit platform sets pL with copyright, when we enter piracy it is
possible to find examples in which only the artists are better off.
The logic behind those results is the same one explained in the previous subsection. To illustrate
the last point, consider the following values: v = 1/2, w = 1, Ω = 11/32, α = 1/4, qiUa = 1/512,
qjUa = 65/256, q
i
Ub = 1/8 and q
j
Ub = 1/16. The profits of the platform are 175/512 if it sets
the high price without piracy, and 11/32 if it sets the low price. Clearly, the for-profit platform
sets the low price with copyright. The consumer surplus in this case is 21/32, the artist a earns
219/512 and the artist b earns 23/64.
Since Ω < 1/2, the for-profit platform sets the high price pˆH with piracy (specification 2). Its
profits in this case are 157/1024. Consumer surplus is 43/128, the artist a earns 585/1024 and
the artist b earns 15/32.
3.7 Welfare Analysis
To continue with the previous logic, it is useful to state the conclusions related to the total
welfare according to the configuration of the music industry.
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3.7.1 Two famous artists
As it was pointed out in the subsection 6.1, it makes no sense to differentiate between the two
specifications of the piracy if the two artists are famous: the revenue from concerts is independent
of the price fixed by the for-profit platform, so it cannot be part of the Nash bargaining program
either with piracy or without it. Furthermore, a famous artist always signs the contract offered
by the for-profit platform, given the equilibrium shares.
To calculate the total surpluses, we just need to add up the agents’ surpluses found out in
subsection 6.1. Then, the total welfare14 with copyright when the for-profit platform optimally
sets the high price is
TS∗H;FF = 2v + w(q
i
a + q
j
a) + w(q
i
b + q
j
b) (3.38)
and the total welfare with copyright when the for-profit platform optimally sets the low price is
TS∗L;FF = 2v(1 + Ω) + w(q
i
a + q
j
a) + w(q
i
b + q
j
b). (3.39)
The total welfare with piracy when the for-profit platform optimally sets the high price is
Tˆ S
∗∗
Hˆ;FF = Tˆ S
∗
Hˆ;FF = 2v(1 + αΩ) + w(q
i
a + q
j
a) + w(q
i
b + q
j
b) (3.40)
and the total welfare with piracy when the for-profit platform optimally sets the low price is
Tˆ S
∗∗
Lˆ;FF = Tˆ S
∗
Lˆ;FF = 2v(1 + Ω) + w(q
i
a + q
j
a) + w(q
i
b + q
j
b). (3.41)
We know that in a situation with copyright, the for-profit platform sets the high price pH in
equilibrium if Ω < 1/2, and the low price otherwise. Also that in a situation with piracy, the
for-profit platform sets the high price pˆH in equilibrium if Ω < 1/2, and the low price otherwise.
The next proposition establishes the changes on total welfare when we move from a situation
with copyright to a situation of piracy in an industry configured by two famous artists.
Proposition 16. Consider an industry configured by two famous artists.
· If Ω < 1/2, the total surplus is higher with piracy than with copyright. Concretely, the
increase in the consumer surplus more than offsets the decrease in the profits of the for-
profit platform and the two artists.
· If Ω ≥ 1/2, the total surplus is the same with and without piracy. In particular, the
for-profit platform and the artists make a welfare transfer to the consumers.
It is straightforward to check that the expression of the total welfare when the for-profit platform
sets the low price with copyright, pL, is identical to the expression of the total welfare when the
platform sets the low price with piracy, pˆL. But obviously, the distribution of this total welfare
14Notice that the total surplus does not depend on the value of the equilibrium shares, r. Then, it is not
necessary to distinguish among interior and corner values.
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is different in the two cases: with piracy, both artists and the for-profit platform are worse off
whereas the consumers are better off.
On the contrary, the total welfare when the for-profit platform sets the high price with copyright,
pH , is lower than the total surplus when it sets the high price with piracy, pˆH . As before, both
artists and the for-profit platform are worse off whereas the consumers are better off. The differ-
ence with the previous paragraph is that, with low price and copyright, the two consumers buy
two tracks. Then, the decrease in prices yielded by piracy does not mean more people buying
more products. However, with high price and copyright, only one consumer acquires the tracks
whereas the other stays out of the market. With piracy and high price, the consumer who buys
the tracks enjoys a higher surplus because of the decrease of the price, but the other consumer
that was previously excluded now has access to the tracks through the open platform. Revenues
derived from concerts are the same in every case and they are not relevant when making welfare
comparisons.
3.7.2 A famous artist and an unknown artist
Contrary to the previous subsection, it is necessary to differentiate between the two specifications
of piracy when the industry is configured by a famous artist and an unknown artist. The revenues
from concerts of the famous artist would never be part of the Nash bargaining program, but the
incentives of the for-profit platform to set one price or another depend on whether the profits
from concerts of the unknown artist are part of the bargaining process.
Without loss of generality, I will say that the famous artist is a and the unknown artist is b.
Remember that, with copyright, the famous artist will always sign the contract with the for-
profit platform. The unknown artist will sign if the for-profit platform sets the low price pL, or
if the for-profit platform sets the high price pH and the probability of consumer j to attend to
his concert after listening his tracks is qjUb < v/w. If q
j
Ub ≥ v/w and the for-profit platform sets
the high price pH , the unknown artist prefers to use the open platform.
By adding up the agents’ surpluses, it is automatic to check that: The total welfare with
copyright when the for-profit platform optimally sets the high price and qjUb < v/w is
TS∗H;FU¯ = 2v + w(q
i
a + q
j
a) + w(q
i
b); (3.42)
the total welfare with copyright when the for-profit platform optimally sets the high price and
qjUb ≥ v/w is
TS∗H;FU = v(1 + α+ αΩ) + w(q
i
a + q
j
a) + w(q
i
b + q
j
b) (3.43)
and the total welfare with copyright when the for-profit platform optimally sets the high price
is
TS∗L;FU = 2v(1 + Ω) + w(q
i
a + q
j
a) + w(q
i
b + q
j
b). (3.44)
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Notice that consumer j cannot attend to the concert of the unknown artist in a situation with
copyright when the for-profit platform sets the high price and the unknown artist signs the
contract with it: since the track of the unknown artist is supplied by the for-profit platform at
a high price, consumer j does not acquire it and does not attend to the concert simply because
she does not know about the existence of the unknown artist.
Again, to sign the contract offered by the for-profit platform in a situation with piracy is always
a dominant strategy for the two types of artists. Then, the total welfare with piracy when the
for-profit platform optimally sets the high price is
Tˆ S
∗∗
Hˆ;FU = Tˆ S
∗
Hˆ;FU = 2v(1 + αΩ) + w(q
i
a + q
j
a) + w(q
i
b + q
j
b) (3.45)
and the total welfare with piracy when the for-profit platform optimally sets the low price is
Tˆ S
∗∗
Lˆ;FU = Tˆ S
∗
Lˆ;FU = 2v(1 + Ω) + w(q
i
a + q
j
a) + w(q
i
b + q
j
b). (3.46)
An important detail to remark is that, although the total surpluses coincide for both specifica-
tions of piracy, the allocation of the total welfare across players is different among them. This
is the key to understand the next proposition:
Proposition 17. Consider an industry configured by a famous artist and an unknown artist.
Total welfare does not decrease when we move from a situation with copyright to a situation
with piracy in which surpluses share according to specification 1. Nevertheless, this result does
not hold in every case for specification 2.
Consider the same example analyzed in the Subsection 6.2. The total welfare with piracy is
209/128, and the total welfare with copyright is 245/128, clearly higher than 209/128. As it
was showed in the Subsection 6.2, only the unknown artist is better off in the presence of piracy
with specification 2, and this positive effect is not enough to compensate the lower welfare of
the rest of the agents.
3.7.3 Two unknown artists
As in the previous subsection, we have to differentiate between the two specifications of the
piracy.
By adding the agents’ surpluses calculated in the Subsection 6.3, I can find the total welfare for
each case. The total welfare with copyright if the for-profit platform optimally charges pH when
qjUa < v/w and q
j
Ub < v/w is
TS∗H;UaUb = 2v + wq
i
a + wq
i
b (3.47)
The total welfare with copyright if the for-profit platform optimally charges pH when q
j
Ua < v/w
and qjUb > v/w is
TS∗H;UaU¯b = v(1 + α+ αΩ) + wq
i
a + w(q
i
b + q
j
b) (3.48)
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The total welfare with copyright if the for-profit platform optimally charges pH when q
j
Ua > v/w
and qjUb < v/w is
TS∗H;U¯aUb = v(1 + α+ αΩ) + w(q
i
a + q
j
a) + wq
i
b (3.49)
The total welfare with copyright if the for-profit platform optimally charges pL is
TS∗L;UaUb = 2v(1 + Ω) + w(q
i
a + q
j
a) + w(q
i
b + q
j
b) (3.50)
Again, to accept the contract offered by the for-profit platform is a dominant strategy for both
artists in the presence of piracy. Then, the total welfare with piracy when the for-profit platform
optimally sets the high price is
Tˆ S
∗∗
Hˆ;UaUb = Tˆ S
∗
Hˆ;UaUb = 2v(1 + αΩ) + w(q
i
a + q
j
a) + w(q
i
b + q
j
b) (3.51)
and the total welfare with piracy when the for-profit platform optimally sets the low price is
Tˆ S
∗∗
Lˆ;UaUb = Tˆ S
∗
Lˆ;UaUb = 2v(1 + Ω) + w(q
i
a + q
j
a) + w(q
i
b + q
j
b). (3.52)
As in 7.2, although the total surpluses coincide for both specifications of piracy, the allocation
of the total welfare across players is different among them. This is the key to understand the
next proposition:
Proposition 18. Consider an industry configured by a famous artist and an unknown artist.
Total welfare does not decrease when we move from a situation with copyright to a situation
with piracy in which surpluses share according to specification 1. Nevertheless, this result does
not hold in every case for specification 2.
Go back to the example analyzed in the Subsection 6.3. We saw that, without piracy, the for-
profit platform optimally sets pL, whereas with the second specification of piracy it sets pˆH . The
total welfare without piracy is 915/512, clearly higher than the total surplus with piracy, 783/512.
3.8 A serious threat: α goes to one
When α goes to one in the presence of piracy, the quality of the tracks available in the open
platform is practically identical to the quality of the tracks supplied by the for-profit platform.
This implies that the two prices that the for-profit platform can charge go to zero.
In addition, independently of the specification of piracy and independently of the type of the
artist, the share of the profits belonging to the artist tends to infinity when α approaches to
one. It means that the corner solution (artist’s share greater or equal to one and, consequently,
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profits of the platform equal to zero) can be reached for a value of α which is relatively far away
from the limiting value of one, contrary to what is stated by the conventional wisdom.
These two things together imply that when α goes to one:
1. the for-profit platform makes exactly zero profits
2. the joint profit of the artists goes to w(qia + q
j
a) + w(qib + q
j
b)
3. the total consumer surplus tends to 2v(1 + Ω)
We can state the following with respect to the distribution of the welfare:
Corollary 1. When α tends to one, the total welfare is the same as the welfare obtained when
the for-profit platform sets the low price. Nevertheless, the distribution of the welfare when
α goes to one collapses to the distribution of welfare if the for-profit platform would leave the
market: since only the open platform would work, transactions would happen at zero price.
Because of the competition among platforms and the almost perfect quality, consumers get the
maximal surplus and, consequently, artists obtain the minimal.
The intuition is very simple: when α goes to one, the tracks supplied by the open platform are
almost perfect substitutes of the tracks offered by the for-profit platform. Then, the prices tend
to zero and, consequently, the consumers’ utility increases and the profits of the artists decrease.
3.9 Conclusions and Discussion
I have constructed a model to analyze the effect of the piracy in the music industry in a situation
with initial copyrights. To do so, I consider two artists that can be heterogeneous in their degree
of popularity (famous or unknown), two consumers that are heterogeneous in their willingness to
pay for tracks but homogeneous in their valuations of concerts, and two platforms: a for-profit
platform and an open platform.
Artists have two revenue sources: sale of tracks and concerts. If the artist is unknown, a con-
sumer cannot attend to his concert without having listened to his tracks before. This is not true
for a famous artist: his style is already known, and a consumer does not need to listen to his
songs in advance to check if she likes him or not. Therefore, diffusion is crucial for the unknown
artists.
With copyright, the artists know that their tracks will be supplied only by the platform they
want. If the artists accept the price set by the for-profit platform, the two parties negotiate and
share the surplus generated by the agreement according tho the Nash bargaining solution.
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The for-profit platform sets a non-zero price for the tracks, so for the high price the unknown
artist does not obtain the maximal degree of diffusion. The open platform supplies the tracks
at zero price, so the unknown artist gets the maximal degree of diffusion but he does not receive
anything from the sale of tracks. Because of this, the unknown artist can choose to set his tracks
in the open platform in equilibrium. The famous artist always sets his tracks in the for-profit
platform.
With piracy, the tracks of all the artists will be available in the open platform, independently of
having accepted the contract of the for-profit platform. Then, piracy decreases the prices that
the for-profit platform can charge for the tracks and allows all the artists to get the maximal
degree of diffusion. With piracy, the dominant strategy for all the artists is to set their songs in
the for-profit platform.
I consider two possible specifications for piracy. In the first specification, the revenues from con-
certs are included in the Nash bargaining between the unknown artist and the for-profit firm.
In the second specification, parties only negotiate about how to share the revenues derived from
the sale of tracks.
I find that with the first specification, the total surplus never decreases: it can remains the same
or increase. But total welfare is always redistributed, such that consumers are always better off
with piracy, the for-profit platform and the famous artist are worse off, and the unknown artist
may be better off in some cases.
With the second specification, the total surplus can decrease. It happens when the for-profit
platform sets a low price with copyright and a high price with piracy. In this case, it is possible
to find examples in which even the consumers lose welfare with respect to the situation with
copyright. Further, the for-profit platform and the famous artist are always damaged also with
this second specification, whereas the unknown artist can earn higher profits.
As a policy recommendation, we can say that the specification 1 is more convenient from a social
point of view.
Let me discuss some key assumptions maintained during the analysis.
The most controversial assumption is to have costs normalized to zero. Precisely, one of the
arguments used against piracy is that creators would not be able to recover their initial invest-
ments and, consequently, they would prefer not to compose the tracks. With this model, I can
determine the upper bound of the fixed costs such that the artist c finds profitable to make the
investment. Concretely, if the fixed cost is lower than w(qic + q
j
c), the artist creates the song.
To gain clarity in the exposition and see more easily the trade-off faced by the unknown artist
between revenues from tracks and diffusion, I made discrete the number of consumers. Their
willingness to pay were chosen such that the demand function was downward sloping. Neverthe-
less, the qualitative results should not change if we consider a continuum of consumers instead.
An important assumption is the direction of the externality. Concretely, I state that consumers
cannot attend to the concert of the unknown artist unless they have listened to his songs before.
However, I do not consider the other direction: if someone goes to a concert and likes the music,
she will buy the tracks of the artist. This approach is used in other papers in the literature and
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they find that, with this additional effect, the piracy can be profitable even for the for-profit
platform. In Section 3 I discussed why my approach could seem more realistic. Furthermore,
in the Introduction I have provided evidence of a passionate defense of the intellectual property
from the labels and famous artists, but also of the incentives of the unknown artists to allow
consumers to download their tracks from their websites. This suggests that, if it exists, the effect
of acquiring the tracks after attending to a concert is relatively small compared to the direction
of the externality that I considered in the analysis.
It is also worth noting that the model has the classical limitations of any static model. I had to
assume the degree of popularity of the artists exogenously, and I did not take into account the
entrance of new artists and consumers into the market. By including some dynamic considera-
tions, it would be possible to determine if piracy actually increases the number of artists in the
industry and if it is easier to become into a famous artist.
An implicit strong assumption was that consumers were aware of any new file available in the
open platform immediately. Evidence shows that actually this behavior is not feasible, so an
interesting extension would be to consider the role of the worth of mouth in the diffusion across
a network of consumers.
Finally, the model could be enriched by considering two-sided markets. In two-sided markets,
consumers’ utility increases in the number of artists who set their tracks in the same platform.
This could be justified because of the reduction in time looking for songs in different platforms.
Then, they would be willing to pay a higher price for the tracks and the for-profit platform could
use this extra money to convince the artists for being the only supplier of the tracks.
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Suppose a consumer that exhibits an exponential utility function8
u(q) = −e−ρ(q−p−x+z)
where q ≷ 0 means quality, ρ > 0 is the risk-aversion coefficient, p ≥ 0 is the price, x ≥ 0 is
the location of the consumer and z ≷ 0 is an element of vertical differentiation different from
quality.
If q is a continuous random variable, the expected utility can be expressed as
E(u) =
∫
f(q)u(q)dq
If the quality is normally distributed, the density function is
f(q) =
1
(2piσ2)1/2
e−
(q−µ)2
2σ2
where µ is the expectation of the quality and σ is the variance.
Then, the expected utility is
8This is also known as CARA (Constant Absolute Risk Aversion) utility function
73
Appendix Chapter 1. Appendix Chapter 1 74
E(u) =
∫ (
1
(2piσ2)1/2
e−
(q−µ)2
2σ2
)(
−e−ρ(q−p−x+z)
)
dq
=
∫ (
1
(2piσ2)1/2
e−
(q−µ)2
2σ2
)((−e−ρq) (−eρ(p+x−z)))dq
=
(
− 1
(2piσ2)1/2
∫
e
−q2−µ2+2µq−2ρqσ2
2σ2 dq
)(
−eρ(p+x−z)
∫
1
(2piσ2)1/2
e−
(q−µ)2
2σ2 dq
)
=
(
− 1
(2piσ2)1/2
∫
e
−(q+(ρσ2−µ))2+ρ2σ4−2ρσ2µ
2σ2 dq
)(
−eρ(p+x−z)
)
= −e ρ
2σ2
2
−ρµ
(
1
(2piσ2)1/2
∫
e
−(q+(ρσ2−µ))2
2σ2 dq
)(
−eρ(p+x−z)
)
= −e ρ
2σ2
2
−ρµ+ρ(p+x−z)
We can take a monotonic transformation of the expected utility to obtain
E(u) = µ− ρσ
2
2
− p− x+ z
Proof of Proposition 1:
Proof. The monopolist solves the below optimization problem:
max
p2
p2x
I
2
The optimal interior price under full information is
pI2 =
q¯
2
Of course, prices must be greater or equal to zero: otherwise, the firm will be paying to the
consumers for acquiring the good and its profits would be negative; consequently, the monopolist
would prefer to be out of the market. Notice that the equilibrium price found in the previous
equation is below zero for any non-positive quality. Therefore, all qualities q¯ ≤ 0 charge a price
equal to zero under full information. For any q¯ ≤ 0, the utility of the consumer located at point
xi given the equilibrium price is
q¯ − 0− xi ≤ 0⇒ xI2 = 0
Consider now q¯ > 0. The equilibrium market share is
xI2 =
q¯
2
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Since the size of the market is 1, the market share would be interior xI2 ∈ (0, 1) ∀q¯ ∈ (0, 2). For
the rest of positive qualities, the market share is the corner solution xI2 = 1 and the maximizing
price is
q¯ − p− 1 = 0⇒ pI2 = q¯ − 1
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. The monopolist solves the below optimization problem:
max
p2
p2x
U
2
with xU2 defined as in equation (1.14).
The optimal interior price when information cannot be disclosed is
pU2 =
1
4
(2µ− ρσ2)
and the interior market share is
xU2 =
1
4
(2µ− ρσ2)
Again, the market share is constrained to the size of the market and negative demands are not
allowed. The case of no demand is xU2 = 0
xU2 ≤ 0⇔ ρ ≥
2µ
σ2
And the charged price is zero: the risk-aversion coefficient is so large, that the monopolist would
have to pay to the consumers in order to convince them to buy the product.
The monopolist supplies to the entire market when xU2 = 1
xU2 ≥ 1⇔ µ > 2 and ρ ≤
−4 + 2µ
σ2
And the charged price is
µ− 1
2
(ρσ2)− pU2 − 1 = 0⇒ pU2 =
1
2
(−2 + 2µ− ρσ2) ≥ 1
In the rest of the cases, the solution is interior
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Proof of Proposition 3:
Proof. In a separating equilibrium, each type of sender optimally chooses a different message
(in this context, each quality would charge a different price) so that the consumers can infer his
type with no error. Then, I have to check if there are some types who have incentives to mimic
the price set by other types.
I start checking if the full-information prices can be a separating equilibrium7. It is worth
remarking that there is no restriction about the quality qF that the quality q wants to mimic.
Then, there may be five possibilities: a non-positive quality mimics the price of a quality between
0 and 2, a non-positive quality mimics the price of a quality larger than 2, a quality between 0
and 2 mimics the price of another quality between 0 and 2, a quality between 0 and 2 mimics the
price of a quality larger than 2, and a quality larger than 2 mimics the price of another quality
larger than 2.
All the programs are very similar: we just need to adjust the price mimicked according to
Proposition 1.
Suppose that the quality 2 > q > 0 wants to mimic the strategy of qF > 2. Given xˆ1 ∈ (0, 1),
the separating equilibrium with the full-information prices is sustainable if
q2
4
≥ (qF − 1)(max{0,min{q − (qF − 1), xˆ1}}+ max{1− xˆ1, 0})
The solution states that q does not want to mimic the price of qF if the proportion of informed
people is sufficiently large. Similar results are obtained from the other programs for any q > 0.
Suppose that the quality q ≤ 0 wants to mimic the strategy of qF > 2. Given xˆ1 ∈ (0, 1), the
separating equilibrium with the full-information prices is sustainable if
0 ≥ (qF − 1)(0 + max{1− xˆ1, 0})
The solution states that any non-positive quality always have incentives to mimic the full-
information price of a quality larger than 2 (∀xˆ1 ∈ (0, 1)). Then, consumers would never be able
to infer that a quality is non-positive.
Given that the full-information prices cannot be sustained as a separating equilibrium, we have
to check if an equilibrium in which the high qualities distort their prices can be sustained.
Concretely, I check if there exists a pair of prices (p, pF ), p ≥ 0 charged by the non-positive
qualities and pF ≥ qF − 1 charged by the qualities larger than 2, such that:
0 > pF (0 + max{qF − pF − xˆ1, 0})
and
pF (max{0, qF − pF }) > p(max{0,min{qF − p, xˆ1}}+ max{qF − pF − xˆ1, 0})
7Notice that in the full information equilibrium, all the non-positive qualities charge a price equal to zero.
However, consumers would not need more information, because their optimal strategy is not to buy any non-
positive quality, it does not matter if it is -1 or -100.
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The previous conditions state that the non-positive quality should not have incentives to mimic
the distorted price, and that to apply such a distortion should not be excessively costly for the
high quality.
However, it does not exist any pair of prices (p, pF ) for which the previous conditions hold at
the same time. Then, a separating equilibrium does not exist.
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof. Take any subinterval (a, b) ⊆ (0, 1). The probability of the event xˆ1 ∈ (a, b) is
Pr(a < xˆ1 < b) = Pr
(
a <
1
2
(2µ− ρσ2 − 2p1 + 2z) < b
)
= Pr
(
2a+ 2p1 − 2µ+ ρσ2
2
< z <
2b+ 2p1 − 2µ+ ρσ2
2
)
=
2b+ 2p1 − 2µ+ ρσ2 + 2Z
4Z
− 2a+ 2p1 − 2µ+ ρσ
2 + 2Z
4Z
=
b− a
2Z
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof. It comes from direct maximization with respect to p1.
When Z is large enough, we can ensure that the probabilities of being in each one of the corners
belong to the interval (0, 1). Furthermore, when Z is large enough, the monopolist does not
want to deviate.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Proof. From Proposition 1, we know the prices for the case of full information. If the first-
period equilibrium price p∗1 is less than 1 and greater than 0, the relevant constraint happens
when q¯ < 2. Then, the pattern of prices is reversed if
p∗1 > p
I
2 ⇔ p∗1 >
q¯
2
⇔ q¯ < 2p∗1
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If the first-period equilibrium price p∗1 ≥ 1, the relevant constraint happens when q¯ ≥ 2. Then,
the pattern of prices is reversed if
p∗1 > p
I
2 ⇔ p∗1 > q¯ − 1⇔ q¯ < p∗1 + 1
Proof of Proposition 6:
Proof. The first part of the Proposition comes from direct maximization.
The second part comes from the comparison between the previous result and the equilibrium
price stated in Proposition 4: the first-period equilibrium price when the consumers are risk-
neutral is simply the expression of the first-period price stated in Proposition 4 evaluated at
ρ = 0. Since the first-period price depends negatively on ρ, the result is proved.
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Suppose a consumer that exhibits an exponential utility function8
u(q) = −e−ρ(q−p−x−(ζ−c))
where q ≷ 0 means quality, ρ > 0 is the risk-aversion coefficient, p ≥ 0 is the price, x ≥ 0 is
the location of the consumer and (ζ − c) ≷ 0 is the difference between the favorite color of the
consumers and the color offered by the brand.
If q is a continuous random variable, the expected utility can be expressed as
E(u) =
∫
f(q)u(q)dq
If the quality is normally distributed, the density function is
f(q) =
1
(2piσ2)1/2
e−
(q−µ)2
2σ2
where µ is the expectation of the quality and σ is the variance.
Then, the expected utility is
8This is also known as CARA (Constant Absolute Risk Aversion) utility function
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E(u) =
∫ (
1
(2piσ2)1/2
e−
(q−µ)2
2σ2
)(
−e−ρ(q−p−x−(ζ−c))
)
dq
=
∫ (
1
(2piσ2)1/2
e−
(q−µ)2
2σ2
)((−e−ρq) (−eρ(p+x+(ζ−c))))dq
=
(
− 1
(2piσ2)1/2
∫
e
−q2−µ2+2µq−2ρqσ2
2σ2 dq
)(
−eρ(p+x+(ζ−c))
∫
1
(2piσ2)1/2
e−
(q−µ)2
2σ2 dq
)
=
(
− 1
(2piσ2)1/2
∫
e
−(q+(ρσ2−µ))2+ρ2σ4−2ρσ2µ
2σ2 dq
)(
−eρ(p+x+(ζ−c))
)
= −e ρ
2σ2
2
−ρµ
(
1
(2piσ2)1/2
∫
e
−(q+(ρσ2−µ))2
2σ2 dq
)(
−eρ(p+x+(ζ−c))
)
= −e ρ
2σ2
2
−ρµ+ρ(p+x+(ζ−c))
We can take a monotonic transformation of the expected utility to obtain
E(u) = µ− ρσ
2
2
− p− x− (ζ − c)
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. When q¯A is known for all the agents, the optimization problems for firms A and B are,
respectively:
max
p2A
p2Ax
I
2
max
p2B
p2B
(
1− xI2
)
Finding the reaction functions and solving the system, the equilibrium prices are
pI2A = 1 +
q¯A
3
; pI2B = 1−
q¯A
3
Plugging these prices into the equation (2.10) to find the equilibrium market share:
xI2 =
3 + q¯A
6
Since negative prices are not allowed, this interior solution is valid for q¯A ∈ (−3, 3). The marginal
consumer is also interior in this support.
When q¯A ≤ −3, the firm A charges a zero price and the firm B supplies to the entire market.
The price that it optimally charges come from the below equation:
q¯A = −p2B − 1⇒ pI2B = −q¯A − 1
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In a similar way, when q¯A ≥ 3, the firm B charges a zero price and the firm A supplies to the
entire market. The price that it optimally charges come from the below equation:
q¯A − p2A − 1 = 0⇒ pI2A = q¯A − 1
Proof of Proposition 8:
Proof. When q¯A cannot be disclosed, the optimization problems for firms A and B are, respec-
tively:
max
p2A
p2Ax
P
2
max
p2B
p2B
(
1− xP2
)
Finding the reaction functions and solving the system, the equilibrium prices are
pP2A = 1 +
µ
3
− ρσ
2
6
; pP2B = 1−
µ
3
+
ρσ2
6
Plugging these prices into the equation (2.14) to find the equilibrium market share:
xI2 =
3 + q¯A
6
Since negative prices are not allowed, this interior solution is valid when µ ≤ 3 and ρ < (6 +
2µ)/σ2; or when µ > 3 and (−6 + 2µ)/σ2 < ρ < (6 + 2µ)/σ2 . The marginal consumer is also
interior under the previous constraints.
When ρ > (6 + 2µ)/σ2, the firm A charges a zero price and the firm B supplies to the entire
market. The price that it optimally charges come from the below equation:
µ− 1
2
(ρσ2) = −p2B − 1⇒ pP2B =
1
2
(−2− 2µ+ ρσ2)
In a similar way, when µ > 3 and ρ ≤ (−6 + 2µ)/σ2, the firm B charges a zero price and the
firm A supplies to the entire market. The price that it optimally charges come from the below
equation:
µ− 1
2
(ρσ2)− p2A − 1 = 0⇒ pP2A =
1
2
(−2 + 2µ− ρσ2)
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Proof of Proposition 9:
Proof. To show that the separating equilibrium may not exist, is enough to provide a counterex-
ample. Just consider the one discussed in the main text.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Proof. Take any subinterval (a, b) ⊆ (0, 1). The probability of the event xˆ1 ∈ (a, b) is
Pr(a < xˆ1 < b) = Pr
(
a <
1
4
(
2− 2p1A + 2p1B + 2µ− ρσ2 + 2(∆c1)
)
< b
)
= Pr
(−2 + 4a+ 2p1A − 2p1B − 2µ+ ρσ2
2
< ∆c1 <
−2 + 4b+ 2p1A − 2p1B − 2µ+ ρσ2
2
)
=
−2 + 4b+ 2p1A − 2p1B − 2µ+ ρσ2 + 2C
4C
− −2 + 4a+ 2p1A − 2p1B − 2µ+ ρσ
2 + 2C
4C
=
b− a
C
Proof of Proposition 10:
Proof. The interior part is simply the result of the regular maximization, with the constraint
meaning that both firms supply to a positive fraction of the market. The corner solutions state
that, when one of the firms optimally supplies to the entire market, its optimal strategy is to
charge a price such that the most distant consumer gains no surplus, given the price of the rival.
As it was explained in the main text, in this situation the negative prices are weakly dominated
for the rival, because its profits are fixed: it supplies to nobody in the first period in expected
terms, and the probability of each one of the corners is 1/2.
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Proof of Proposition 11:
Proof. Remember that, for the two patterns to be reversed simultaneously, it is necessary p∗1A > 0
and p∗1B > 0. Start considering that q¯A ∈ (−3, 3). Then,
pI2A < p
∗
1A ⇔ q¯A < 3(p∗1A − 1)
and
pI2B < p
∗
2A ⇔ q¯A > 3(1− p∗1B)
For these two things to happen simultaneously,
2 < p∗1A + p
∗
1B ⇔ 2 <
−ΠI2A + ΠP2A + ΠI2B −ΠP2B + 2C
C
⇔ −ΠI2A + ΠP2A + ΠI2B −ΠP2B > 0
Several numerical simulations show that, in fact, −ΠI2A+ΠP2A+ΠI2B−ΠP2B < 0, so contradiction.
Notice that, by a monotonicity argument, the reversion of the two pattern of prices cannot
happen either when q¯A ≤ −3 or when q¯A ≥ 3, because the equilibrium prices of the second
period are even more extreme.
Proof of Proposition 12:
Proof. The first part of the proposition is simply the solution to the model with risk-neutral
consumers. For the second part, consider the example provided in the main text.
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Proof of Proposition 13
Proof. First, by comparison of profits, it is automatic to check that the for-profit platform sets
the high price with copyright if Ω < 1/2 and the low price with copyright if Ω ≥ 1/2. In the
same way, it sets the high price with piracy if Ω < 1/2 and the low price with piracy if Ω ≥ 1/2.
Then, we have to compare the sets of equations (3.20) and (3.22) when Ω < 1/2 and the sets of
equations (3.21) and (3.23) when Ω ≥ 1/2. Simple algebra provides the result when equilibrium
shares are plugged.
Proof of Proposition 14
Proof. The proof is based on the comparison between profits. Because of the complexity derived
from checking all the possible parametric regions, including the corners, the proof was done with
the help of the software Mathematica. Files are available upon request.
Proof of Proposition 15
Proof. The proof is based on the comparison between profits. Because of the complexity derived
from checking all the possible parametric regions, including the corners, the proof was done with
the help of the software Mathematica. Files are available upon request.
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Proof of Proposition 16
Proof. The proof requires the expressions of surpluses found out in subsection 6.1.
Let me start with the case of Ω < 1/2. The for-profit platform optimally sets the price pH with
copyright and pˆH with piracy. Since αΩ > 0, we conclude that the total surplus with piracy is
higher than the total surplus with copyright by comparing equations (3.38) and (3.40). From
Proposition , we know that the profits of the artists and the for-profit platform decrease, whereas
the consumer surplus increases. Therefore, we can conclude that the increase in the consumer
surplus more than offsets the losses of the other agents.
Now consider Ω ≥ 1/2. The for-profit platform optimally sets the price pL with copyright and
pˆL with piracy. We conclude that the total surplus with piracy is identical to the total surplus
with copyright by comparing equations (3.39) and (3.41). From Proposition 13, we know that
the profits of the artists and the for-profit platform decrease, whereas the consumer surplus
increases. Therefore, we can conclude that there is simply a redistribution of welfare from the
for-profit platform and the artists to the consumers.
Proof of Proposition 17
Proof. The proof is based on the comparison between profits. Because of the complexity derived
from checking all the possible parametric regions, including the corners, the proof was done with
the help of the software Mathematica. Files are available upon request.
Proof of Proposition 18
Proof. The proof is based on the comparison between profits. Because of the complexity derived
from checking all the possible parametric regions, including the corners, the proof was done with
the help of the software Mathematica. Files are available upon request.
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